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21 Prologue
Lebanon is a special case in many ways. It was created to give the Maronite Christians their own 
state, something they had pushed towards for many years, but were never powerful enough to 
achieve by themselves. Lebanon first became a reality as a sovereign nation in 1943 after being 
granted independence by France, the former colonial master. Despite being inhabited by numerous 
other groups with different religious backgrounds, the Maronites for many years dominated the 
political life, backed by France. Alone, the Maronites were and are a minority, as are all the other 
groups when viewed separately. This means that no single faction1 is numerous enough to gain 
absolute majority in a democratic system. 
At the conception of the Lebanese state, the political system was designed to share the power 
between the factions, and was largely the result of cooperation between two of the most dominant 
factions, the Maronites and the Sunnis. The Maronites enjoyed the highest degree of influence, 
while the single largest group, the Shia was the least influential of the three dominant groups, 
Maronites, Sunnis and Shia2. 
The country was a showcase of positive economic development up until the civil war from 1975 –
1989, which in fact was two wars and a long inter-war period marked by great instability and lack 
of central governmental control. Internal strife and political corruption thrived before the outbreak 
of the war, and as the war illustrates, there was a great divide between the different factions in 
Lebanon. The arrival of the Palestinians after their expulsion from first Israel in the late 1940’s and 
later Jordan in the early 1960’s remains however the spark that lit the fire, as both politicians and 
the public were split on whether to assist them or expel them from Lebanese territory.
While the popular saying goes that a war has no winners, usually some factions have done better 
than others by the time hostilities cease. In Lebanon’s case the saying seems to be right, though, or 
at least such a winner, is difficult to determine. The Ta’if Accord ended the war by essentially re-
using the old system of government, taking power from the Maronites and increasing it for 
                                                
1 When using the words ‘faction’, ‘religious group’, ‘group’, ‘sect’ or ‘community’, we refer to the religiously defined 
groups in the Lebanese society and political life, and the five terms will be used interchangeable.  
2 Sunni and Shia Muslims disagree on many points. However, the biggest difference is that Shia Muslims believe that 
Muhammad’s successor, Ali ibn Abi Taleb, who was the Prophet’s son in law, should be the historical leader of the 
Muslims. The Sunnis disagree and believe the Muslims should be allowed to choose their own leaders, and they thereby 
do not support Abi Taleb. (Brancati 2004:8f)
3especially the Shia. The accord stipulated that Syria had the task of keeping the peace, thus giving 
them practical control of the entire country, all in spite of the fact that Syria had been a major 
participant in the civil war and hardly could be described as a neutral party. Syrian control remained 
until recently when Syria was forced to leave Lebanon, not just by popular Lebanese sentiment, but 
by a UN resolution as well. This came as a result of the alleged Syrian assassination in February 
2005 of ex-prime minister Rafiq Hariri, an important critique of Syrian presence and policy. Since 
the Syrian exit, there has been renewed focus on the Lebanese situation. Many Lebanese people fear 
that a new war will come within the foreseeable future, and the groups still show signs of distrust 
towards each other, for example concerning post-war violence. This suggests a need for 
reconciliation between the groups in the country, who in many ways are still divided. Researchers 
in the field of conflict resolution argue that reconciliation is a central component of peace building 
and that war will return to post conflict areas if anger and hatred are not addressed (Brounéus 
2003:9, Lederach 1997:24). The Ta’if Accord is also called the Charter for National Reconciliation, 
and in the agreement, great focus is put on the achievement of national unity in Lebanon. 
We wish to examine what the government in Lebanon is doing to achieve reconciliation and 
national unity between the war-torn populace. Reconciliation and national unity have two different 
meanings and we see the first as a tool or prerequisite for the second. We want to find out what has 
been done by the government and what the preliminary effects have been. Furthermore, we find it 
important to look at the challenges in this process and the possible obstacles to achieving 
reconciliation and national unity. In addition to this, we will address the society and its role in the 
process. This seems important, as it may serve as an indicator on which initiatives should be 
initiated in Lebanon today, and how the contemporary initiatives are working. We argue that if the 
government programmes are to work, there needs to be a wish and a will coming from the society 
below. 
1.1 Problem Definition
Which initiatives has the government started in order to achieve reconciliation and national 
unity? 
Which challenges do the initiatives face, and which preliminary effects have there been? 
Does the society show any indications that it is ready for reconciliation and national unity?
42 Definitions
In this chapter we will discuss and define the various terms and concepts used both in the problem 
definition and in the rest of the project. This will be done both to create clarity around some of the 
concepts and to deduce a working definition from theory.
2.1 Government
We wish to clarify what we mean when we use the word ‘government’ in our problem definition. 
We are aware, that there are many factions in the political system and in the government in 
Lebanon. As will be described in detail in a later chapter, the government in Lebanon is founded on 
power sharing, and the government therefore consists of a broad coalition, where all the factions are 
represented. Through this power sharing agreement, which was imposed by the Ta’if Accord, the 
factions are forced to cooperate, but this does not mean that they agree on everything. 
We will focus our analysis on what the government is doing as a unit. The only instance where we 
know one group is more involved than the others is in the rebuilding of Beirut. The company, 
Solidere, which is responsible for the reconstruction of the city, is run by the Hariri family, who are 
Sunni, and who currently lead the largest coalition in the Lebanese Parliament3. However, Solidere 
might be carrying out the reconstruction, but it is still a joint public/private project, meaning the 
government has influence on its implementation. (Haugbølle 2005:198) For an insight into the 
different parties currently in government, see chapter 4.2. 
2.2 Reconciliation
We have chosen to focus on reconciliation, as one of the two main theoretical terms in this project, 
because the Ta’if Accord, on which the political system in Lebanon is based, is also called the 
Charter of National Reconciliation (Knudsen 2005:2). Additionally, the Ministry of Displaced has 
stated that one of their main goals is reconciliation (UNDP Webpage 1). There are many different 
definitions of the concept ‘reconciliation’. Our discussion here will be mostly based on a report 
made by SIDA, written by Karen Brounéus4, which gives a general overview of the different 
                                                
3 This is called the Rafiq Hariri Martyr List and is made up of seven parties and some individuals. It controls 72 of the 
Parliament’s 128 seats. (Safa 2006:23)
4 Brounéus has a PhD in Psychology and works at the Swedish Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Her main 
area of expertise is reconciliation after internal conflict (Webpage 1)   
5stances on reconciliation. We will also draw on other theorists and researchers in the field of 
reconciliation in the discussion. 
Almost all scholars and researchers in this field agree that reconciliation is a very long process, 
which is rooted in society, but which can be furthered by the government (Brounéus 2003:49ff, 
Whittaker 1999:114f, Hauss 2003, Lederach 1997:84). Reaching reconciliation does not imply that 
there is a state of total harmony in society. Rather it is to build constructive relationships between 
people, which can bring about sustainable peace (Brounéus 2003:25). Here we agree with Professor 
John Paul Lederach5 who sees: “…reconciliation as a tool for developing relationship…”
(Lederach 1997:34). In Lebanon’s case this will be relationships between the communities and the 
religious groups. 
Another aspect, which is important in reconciliation, is acknowledgement of the past: 
“Acknowledging past atrocities recognises the survivors’ suffering and can help reinstate a sense of 
dignity and security.” (Brounéus 2003:12). 
This leads us to the working definition, which we will use in this project:
Reconciliation is a societal process [which can be furthered by the government] that involves mutual 
acknowledgement of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviour into constructive 
relationships toward sustainable peace. (Brounéus 2003:3 [Our additions])
The more practical methods for obtaining reconciliation will be discussed in chapter 6.1. As is 
evident above, we have chosen not to include the concept of forgiveness in our definition. This 
concept is mostly used by Christians in general, and it has especially been promoted as an essential 
part of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. 
Lebanon specialist George Irani6 also sees forgiveness as an important part of reconciliation: 
In order to reach reconciliation, you must make two steps. The first step is called acknowledgement. 
Acknowledgement means that you admit that you committed a crime. That is a very important step towards
                                                
5 Lederach is Professor of International Peacebuilding at Notre Dame University, and de has published 12 books and 
numerous articles on the subjects of reconciliation and peace building (Webpage 2). 
6 Irani is assistant Professor at the Lebanese American University in Beirut and is a former Senior Fellow at the United 
States Institute of Peace. His area of expertise is reconciliation and forgiveness in Lebanon. (Webpage 3) 
6forgiveness, because if you do not have acknowledgement, nothing is happening. When you have 
acknowledgement, forgiveness is possible, and after forgiveness, you have reconciliation. (Høxbroe 1999:82)
He thereby sees it as a process where forgiveness is an important stage in order to reach 
reconciliation. We, however, agree with Brounéus’ notion that viewing forgiveness as essential to 
reconciliation can cause problems, as victims cannot be forced to forgive. Certain acts are for some 
individuals unforgivable, and the victims should therefore never be expected or pushed to forgive 
(Brounéus 2003:17). As we see it, forgiveness furthers reconciliation but it is not essential. Our 
argument for this statement is that we use the concept of reconciliation to describe the government’s 
initiatives and not to talk about the individual process of reconciliation. Forgiveness is an aspect of 
reconciliation which is individual, since it cannot be forced from above. We will, however, still use 
the concept in our discussions, especially in relation to the willingness to forgive in the population, 
as we believe this could mirror a will to reconcile. Conclusively, forgiveness is not a prerequisite 
for reconciliation, but its presence makes reconciliation more likely.
As we see it, achieving reconciliation does not imply that all animosity between the conflicting 
groups is resolved and total harmony is accomplished. Reconciliation should rather be seen as a tool 
to facilitate national unity in the future. This is why both the terms appear separately in our problem 
definition. They have two different meanings, and we believe reconciliation comes prior to national 
unity and can be described as a prerequisite for it. 
2.3 National Unity
As it appears from our analysis of the Ta’if Accord in chapter 5.1, it talks about unity and about 
making Lebanon into a unified nation. From this we have deduced that it is one of the government’s 
goals to achieve national unity in the country. To explain our definition of national unity, we will 
use Etienne Balibar7 and Benedict Anderson8 to clarify what a nation is and how it becomes unified. 
We have not included any counter theories, but refer to chapter 8. for a discussion of how, and with 
which purpose, such counter theories could be used. Although Anderson and Balibar do not use the 
term national unity, they explain how a state becomes a nation, how it nationalises the society and 
reproduces itself through the population. Therefore, we find their theories and definitions relevant 
                                                
7 Dr. Balibar is now Professor emeritus of Moral and Political Philosophy at the University of Paris X, Nanterre, and 
Distinguished Professor of Humanities at the University of California, Irvine (Webpage 4)
8 Professor Anderson is Associate Director of Government and Asian Studies at Cornell University (Webpage 5). 
7to use when talking about Lebanon and its government’s goal to develop a national unity. Later in 
our project, we will use the theories to shed light upon the government’s challenges due to the 
population’s different images of the nation. Below, we will discuss some of Balibar and Anderson’s 
theoretical views of the nation, its creation, reproduction and uniting abilities. Conclusively, we will 
summarise the main concepts used by the two theorists and articulate our understanding of national 
unity, which will be our working definition of the concept. 
It is the opinion of Balibar that ‘the nation’ is more an abstract notion, an idea, than it is something 
concrete. It is a social narrative presented by the state, which instils a sense of unity and continuity 
in its population. The formation of the nation thus appears as something, which has been going on 
for centuries in a way that all events, regardless of them at their present time having anything to do 
with the nation, are steps towards the inevitable. The nation is therefore perceived as an ongoing 
project which its population is part of. (Balibar 1991:86f) An example of this is when Americans 
view Thanksgiving as something typical American in spite of the fact that at the time the pilgrims 
landed on the American east coast, no one for another couple of hundred years would even think of 
the USA, let alone the USA as a nation state. 
Balibar is of the opinion that the nation is an imagined community, since it relies on institutions 
within the state to reproduce it (Balibar 1991:93). Anderson agrees with Balibar that the nation is an 
imagined community, and as such is a social construction. Anderson further defines the nation as 
being an imagined political community, which is imagined as both limited and sovereign. It is 
imagined, since most inhabitants in a nation do not know each other but still feel a kinship. It is a 
community since the nation is always imagined as something where all participants are equal. One 
cannot be more French than other Frenchmen. It is imagined as limited since the nation shares 
boundaries with other nations, which are not part of the community. As such, an important part of 
the people’s imagining of the nation seems to be defining themselves as what they not, e.g. the 
French are not German. (Anderson 1983:6f) This coincides with Balibar’s notion of ‘external 
frontiers’ becoming ‘internal frontiers’, in that the imagining of external boundaries help define 
‘home’ (Balibar 1991:94f). Finally, an important part of this image is that the state is sovereign, 
which means that there is nothing above the nation; it is supreme. (Anderson 1983:6f)     
8Anderson is of the opinion that the nation is a recent phenomenon and that it is predominantly 
shaped by the events of capitalism and the invention of the printing press, as well as its pre-history 
(Anderson 1983:37ff). Balibar is not far from Anderson’s opinion regarding institutions, which 
made the nation state possible, but he further states that the emergence of capitalism is an 
inadequate explanation. Balibar mentions other institutions such as language, as being important 
(Balibar 1991:87f). Bearing this in mind, the nation seems to be the sum of events, conflicts and the 
influence from various institutions, for example religion, judicial system and language, within a 
well defined geographical area.
Nationalism and the nation state are in constant change and reinterpretation as times passes. Balibar 
therefore states, that the task for a state or a government to finally nationalise its population once 
and for all, is endless. This endless task can for instance be seen in old nations, which have been, 
and still are, struggling with unification of its population, due to issues such as integrating 
immigrations, integration of the peasantry, integration of different religions etc., which has 
sometimes resulted in wars and revolutions. Balibar argues that to avoid these violent outbursts, the 
state developed national institutions to function as a ‘national-social state’, meaning that it 
intervened in the formation of its population’s ‘private life’. The results of the national-social state 
has been: “…entirely to subordinate the existence of the individuals of all classes to their status as 
citizens of the nation-state, to the fact of their being ‘nationals’ that is.”. (Balibar 1991:92)
As the state meddles in the population’s private life through: “…a network of apparatuses and daily 
practice, the individual is instituted as homo nationalis from cradle to grave … “ (Balibar 1991:93). 
The state is thus able to produce the people to re-produce the state’s national image into being one 
collective community. In relation to this, Balibar further argues that every institution of the state 
functions as a productive instrument to reproduce the state’s image. The image of the common 
nation, the state wants to project onto the population, becomes real to the individual when the 
people use the state’s national apparatuses. Thus, via usage of its institutions, the people recognise 
the state as their own as opposed to other states. (Balibar 1991:93) This coincides well with 
Anderson’s notion of the nation being limited and sovereign. It can therefore be argued, that the 
state and the government’s institutions can help unify a nation and thereby create national unity. 
However, for the people at all to reproduce the state’s image through its institutional apparatuses, 
these must demonstrate credibility, and they must function effectively in society. 
9For the people to identify with its nation-state as if they truly belong to it, Balibar describes how a 
state can fabricate its members. He terms the method as a fabrication of ‘fictive ethnicity’. When 
producing a fictive ethnicity, which the population can identify with, they then become devoted to 
the state and government. If the state can convince its population that they ethnically belong to it, 
the state can project an image of a pre-existing national unity. (Balibar 1991:96) As prerequisites to 
the fabrication of fictive ethnicity, Balibar suggests two important factors. One is a common 
language and the other is a common race. He explains that when a population uses one language it 
constitutes a language community: “… which produces the feeling that it has always existed, (…) 
Ideally, it ‘assimilates’ anyone, but holds no one.”. (Balibar 1991:99) Since Balibar states that a 
language cannot hold people together by itself, it needs a ‘second-degree fiction’, which is race. He 
argues that race symbolises something ethnic, biological, and spiritual and it therefore creates a 
kinship of belongingness. So when the state expresses that the population consists of one particular 
race, subsequently it makes the people interrelated and that is how the second ‘ethnicisation’ is 
being fabricated. Balibar further notes that it becomes difficult for a state to reproduce 
nationalisation and belongingness when there exists more than one dominant race within a nation. 
An example of racial ethnicisation is when people get married to their own kind and it seems as a 
‘normal’ or a ‘natural’ wedding, as opposed to marriages with people from other races, which then 
would be seen as abnormal. (Balibar 1991:100)
It is Balibar’s argument that within a state one dominant ’ideological state apparatus’ should exist, 
which using various institutions reproduces ‘fictive ethnicity’. The most important institutions in 
modern nations for achieving this reproduction are the schools and the family. In reality this means 
that the state using a central state apparatus should control the schools and influence the family 
structures in whatever way that would lead to the reproduction of ‘fictive ethnicity’, which can be 
seen as essential part of nationalism. (Balibar 1991:102f) This especially seems to be relevant in 
Lebanon’s case, since there is no strong state apparatus, and services are not provided by the state 
but by a feudal system, and the state is as a result impaired in the task of producing the sense of 
national belongingness and unity.  
As the nation is imagined, it is an image that needs to be produced and reproduced. As such, it can 
be consciously changed by the state. To create national unity, it is beneficial if the government 
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develops a chain of various governmental institutions that in the end produce a common imagined 
national unity. These apparatus can through the services they provide for the people help create an 
image, which the population can identify with and hence feel they belong to the same united nation. 
Conclusively, our working definition relies on the principle that the nation is imagined, and as such 
can be constructed and thus also reconstructed. In reality, this means that national unity is a 
homogenous or harmonious perception of what the nation is among the population. 
2.4 Society
In our problem definition we use the term ‘society’, and with this term we intend to cover all of 
society, which is not encompassed by the government. The term can be divided into two other 
terms: ‘population’ and ‘civil society’. By population we mean the people in society as such, on the 
individual level. These people can belong to different groups and religions, but when we in this 
project refer to them as the population, we refer to the individuals and their subjective opinions. 
This is especially relevant in chapter 6.1, where we use a study, which is based on interviews with 
individuals in the population.
The term civil society will, however, be used to refer to the parts of society which are organised to 
some degree. There are many different definitions of what the term civil society entails. We agree 
with Andrew Heywood’s9 definition of the term, saying that civil society is: “The realm of 
autonomous groups and associations; a private sphere independent from public authority.” 
(Heywood 2002:8). These ‘groups’ encompass businesses, interest groups, trade unions, community 
groups, clubs, families, kinship groups etc. Edward Burke10 agrees with Heywood and states that 
these groups differentiate themselves by being private in the sense that they are initiated and funded 
by individual citizens. 
George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel11, on the other hand, disagrees that families should be included in 
the definition, as he views them as: “…a sphere of egoism and selfishness.” (Heywood 2002: 8).  
                                                
9 Heywood is Course Director for Politics, and Director of Studies at Orpington College, and he has published 
numerous books on the subjects of Politics and Ideologies.
10 Burke was an eighteenth century political theorist, who is seen as one of the founders of Conservatism (Heywood 
2002: 47)
11 Hegel was an eighteenth and nineteenth century philosopher, who is seen as the founder of Modern Idealism 
(Heywood 2002:86)
11
We have chosen to keep the term ‘family’ in our definition of civil society as families play a special 
role in the Lebanese society. Unlike in the West, the families in Lebanon are the main building 
block in the patron/client network, which take on most of the social security services in the 
communities, as we discuss in chapter 4.2. These networks thereby constitute a kind of Civil 
Society Organisation (CSO) and are therefore an important part of the Lebanese civil society. 
Conclusively, when we use the term civil society, we refer to all the groups in the Lebanese society, 
which can be official or unofficial, but have in common that they are not controlled or funded by 
the government. As mentioned above, the term society should be seen as encompassing both the 
population and the civil society, but these two terms will also be used separately throughout the 
project, as they do refer to slightly different parts of society. 
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3 Method
The purpose of this project is to discuss what the Lebanese government has done in order to achieve 
reconciliation and national unity in Lebanon. In addition to describing and discussing the initiatives 
that have been started, we also wish to discuss which challenges the government is facing in this 
process, which preliminary effects there have been, and how the initiatives are being received by 
the society. 
3.1 Ontology and Epistemology 
In all the major discussions in this project, our point of departure is always our empirical data. Only 
after a thorough examination of this, our ontological field, have we chosen and drawn in theories to 
describe the field or to criticise it. Following this, we have returned to the empirical data to discuss 
the theory in relation to the case. This back and forth motion between the empirical data and the 
theory is similar to a method called retroduction. 
The retroductive method is described by Critical Realism. According to this theory, the ontological 
field is the most crucial for the answering of the research questions posed by the project (Jespersen 
2004:145). Like the Critical Realists, we view the ontological field as open and interchangeable, but 
it is only a fraction of it that is viewable to the researcher. The rest is under the surface and only 
partly transcendental. (Jespersen 2004:148f) Because our field of research is only partly open and 
changeable, a one-dimensional method is not appropriate. This means that neither induction nor 
deduction can alone be used to analyse the field. Critical Realism combines the two opposites and 
uses both the observations from induction and the theoretical deduction, and this can be described 
as retroduction in a back and forth motion. (Jespersen 2004:156)
In chapter 5.1, however, we are also inspired by another scientific method, namely Discourse 
Theory. Below we will elaborate on the specific considerations about the methods, which we use in 
each chapter.
3.2 Project Design
In order to create the proper foundation for answering the problem definition and examining what 
the government is doing, it is important to examine the political and societal framework in which 
they are operating. To shed light on this, we will first give a short historical background for the civil 
13
war and the divisions in society, as this influences the society and government today. We will then 
use current empirical data and information about the political system and the issues in the media to 
paint a picture of how the political system is today, with its parties and power sharing. Throughout 
this empirical chapter, we also discuss considerations about the historical and current prospects for 
unity in Lebanon, as this is relevant for the further project. The empirical data used in this chapter 
will be historical works about Lebanon, but also up to date information from the Internet about the 
current situation in Lebanon. We have especially used recent news articles and data from the 
parties’ webpages. During the discussions later in the project, we will draw on these introductory 
chapters to shed further light on the different issues. 
Still with the purpose of examining the framework in which the reconciliation and national unity is 
to be obtained, we wish to answer the first sub-question: Does the accord and the political system 
facilitate or impede reconciliation and national unity in the Lebanese society? In order to shed 
light on this, we will first analyse the Ta’if Accord, which constitutes the framework of the political 
system. This will be an in-depth text analysis of the authentic accord, which is our primary 
empirical data in this chapter12. Since the Ta’if Accord is a legislative text, we have chosen to 
analyse it using text analysis. This is done in order to gain knowledge of which parts of the text is 
particularly relevant to the project. As the method for doing this we use some of the tools created by 
discourse analyst Norman Fairclough13, due to his comprehensive text analysis method. 
Fairclough’s method of analysis revolves around the three dimensions of the text, the discursive 
practice, the text and the social practice (Fairclough 1992:4). It is not our intention to actually 
discourse analyse the text but only to concentrate on giving a general idea of what is important in 
the accord. 
Excerpts from the text will be analysed according to the discursive practice, which is the setting and 
the historical context of the text (Fairclough 1992:79). Keywords or wording will also be 
highlighted in some cases, as these particular words are used in a particular way throughout the text, 
usually by using them repeatedly (Fairclough 1992:77). The reason for using these parts of the 
discourse analysis method is to underline which discourse the drafters of the text were trying to 
                                                
12 We have attached the accord in full length as Appendix 1. 
13 Fairclough has a PhD in linguistics from Lancaster University. He both teaches and conducts research at Lancaster 
University, and his main occupation regarding this is his critical discourse analysis. (Webpage 8)
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produce, and to understand the role and impact of the Ta’if Accord on the Lebanese political 
framework.
The analysis will be with special reference to national unity and reconciliation. In the discussion we 
will use the political theorist Arend Lijphart’s14 theory about Consociationalism, as we argue this is 
the power sharing model on which the accord is based. In the discussion and critique of this 
consociational power sharing model, we will use political theorist Donald Horowitz15 to discuss the 
power sharing model in the accord and how it effects the creation of reconciliation and national 
unity in Lebanon. In this chapter, we start with the empirical data, using the Discourse Theory as 
inspiration for our analysis. We then discuss this data with our theories from Lijphart and Horowitz. 
During this discussion, we continuously draw on other empirical data about Lebanon, thereby 
finishing the retroductive back and forth motion.
Only after we have examined the political framework, as described above, we can move on to look 
at the initiatives started by the government to achieve reconciliation and national unity. We have 
chosen three initiatives as examples of the government’s work towards reconciliation and unity. 
These have been chosen as they were the ones given most significance by other researchers in the 
field, and to our knowledge, the only initiatives started by the Lebanese government. Each initiative 
is connected with a sub-question. We have structured the answering of each sub-question to match 
our problem definition. The retroductive method is common through all these three chapters. The 
first part of each chapter will describe the initiative and its creation, using empirical data about the 
government’s initiative. The second part will discuss the challenges the government has faced and 
the preliminary effects of the initiative, using theories about such initiatives and the experiences 
from other countries. The third and last part will deal with the society and their readiness for and 
acceptance of the initiative and discuss what has been done by the society itself thereby drawing in 
empirical data again, and ending the retroduction. Our discussion and analysis will not be confined 
to one chapter or paragraph, but will be evident continuously throughout the different parts of the 
project. 
                                                
14 Lijphart is professor emeritus of Political Science. His area of expertise is comparative politics, democratic 
institutions and ethnic groups in politics. (Webpage 6)   
15 Horowitz’s area of expertise is International Affairs and he has been consulted by many governments to aid the 
resolution of ethnic conflicts in countries like Russia, Rumania, Nigeria, and Northern Ireland. (Webpage 7) 
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The first initiative is the Law of General Amnesty, issued in 1991. As a result of this law, the 
perpetrators from the war are now both walking the streets of Beirut and the corridors of Parliament 
(Haugbølle 2002). We argue that the law was issued to create stability and to lay the foundation for 
future reconciliation. Here the question we will attempt to answer is: How has the Law of General 
Amnesty influenced the process of reconciliation and unity, and are the groups ready for 
reconciliation? We will discuss the law and its influence on reconciliation. We regret that we have 
not been able to find the Law of General Amnesty translated into English. We have therefore 
chosen to use a report from Amnesty International, which contains a useful description and 
criticism of the law, instead (Amnesty International 1997). As the reconciliation process is still 
relatively young, the discussion about the effect of the law will be mostly theoretical, and we will 
draw on experiences from other methods of legal reconciliation used in other countries. In our 
discussion, we will use different theories about the role of justice in reconciliation, e.g. Nigel 
Biggar16, who sees the issues of truth and justice as essential to the achievement of reconciliation. 
This we then analyse against the political situation in Lebanon and considerations about the groups’ 
readiness for reconciliation. This will especially be based on an empirical study from 2002 made by 
Fabiola Azar and Etienne Mullet17. Their study was based on interviews with individuals from the 
six major groups in Lebanon: Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox, Sunni, Shia and Druze, and it shows 
the propensity to forgive among these different groups (Azar et al. 2002:737). As we argue in our 
above definition of reconciliation, although forgiveness is not essential for reconciliation, 
willingness to forgive does mirror a will to reconcile. This is why we include Azar and Mullet’s 
study.  
The second initiative is the establishment of the Ministry of Displaced in 1992 and its efforts at 
resettling the displaced people back to where they lived before the war started. The question we 
wish to answer here is: What has the Ministry of Displaced done to promote reconciliation, 
how is this initiative being received by society and what has the society done itself? The 
purpose of the Ministry’s programmes is to create neighbourhoods with mixed religious 
backgrounds, like before the war. We want to examine what this Ministry has done to promote 
reconciliation and unity between the groups, and which preliminary effects the programmes have 
                                                
16 Biggar is Professor in Theology and Ethics and the issue of burying the past after civil conflict is one of his main 
areas of research. (Webpage 9) 
17 Azar is assistant Professor at Social Sciences Institute of Beirut and Mullet is the director of Hautes Etudes. They 
both specialise in the area of forgiveness and reconciliation. (Azar et al. 2002:746)
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had on the society. As the Ministry of Displaced has not published any reports in English, we have 
mainly used reports and data from their donor organisation United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). In the discussion, we will use the before mentioned political theorists Lijphart 
and Horowitz and their views on the benefits of living in mixed or separated communities. We will 
also discuss whether or not the society in Lebanon is ready for such a heterogenisation of their 
communities and examine what has been done locally by CSOs or other actors. This part of the 
discussion will primarily be based on a 2003 study carried out by Samar El-Masri18, who 
interviewed 10 heads of CSOs in Lebanon. This will shed light on the society’s overall readiness for 
reconciliation.
The third and last initiative, we will examine, is the rebuilding of Beirut, which is, as mentioned 
earlier, a joint project between the government and the private company Solidere. Here we will 
attempt to answer the question: Which steps has the government made to promote 
reconciliation and national unity by rebuilding Beirut? We will here look at the rebuilding of 
Beirut and discuss whether or not the focus on Beirut as both the new Middle Eastern Hong Kong, 
and the Paris of the Middle East, will help further reconciliation and national unity. We will 
furthermore discuss how the displaying of ancient archaeological finds in the city has an impact on 
reconciliation. The lack of government built monuments or museums to commemorate the war will 
also be discussed. We will also use Balibar to discuss whether or not the government can produce 
the people and develop a common unity by projecting an image of Beirut as the past and the future 
of Lebanon. Finally, the reactions and initiatives from the society will be taken into account.
This is mainly a political project, as the key focus is on what the government has done, and how the 
political system is influencing the initiatives. However, it is not our wish to view the issues solely 
from a top-down perspective. This is why we have also incorporated discussions about the effects 
on society and the society’s own reactions continuously through the project. To add a sociological 
dimension to our project we draw on the sociological aspects of the two main theoretical concepts 
in this project, which are reconciliation and national unity, as discussed and defined in chapter 2. 
Throughout the project, we will draw on the discussions of the two concepts from that chapter. 
However, in the different parts of the project the two concepts will not carry equal weight. Despite 
                                                
18 El-Masri is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario. His areas 
of expertise are ethnic conflict and ethnic conflict resolution, with special concentration on consociationalism and social 
transformation. (Webpage 10)
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this, we will aim at incorporating deliberations about the two concepts in all chapters. We are well 
aware that there are many other interpretations of the nation and the creation of unity. We have, 
however, chosen to concentrate especially on Balibar in this project, with some reference to 
Anderson as well, since these two theorists share the notion that the nation is imagined. By using 
Balibar and Anderson’s theories about the imagined nation, it is interesting to relate the 
government’s current initiatives to reconstruct a national image. The reason for this limitation to 
one view of nation and nationalism is that the Lebanese government itself shows a belief in the 
imagined and constructed national image. This is evident in the Ta’if Accord, where the drafters try 
to instil a sense of unity, and in the rebuilding of Beirut, where a unifying image is attempted 
projected to the society. While we do not criticise this view of the nation as something constructed, 
the consequences and impact of a counter theory about nation and nationalism will be discussed in 
chapter 8. 
After the answering of each sub-question, there will be a very short conclusion, which contains the 
main points in the above discussion and analysis. In the end, there will be a general conclusion, 
which discusses and answers the problem definition, and subsequently proposes some possible 
suggestions about what should be done about reconciliation and national unity in the future. 
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4 Lebanon: Past and Present
4.1 The Origin of the Lebanese Divisions and the Civil War
The Lebanese state is a relatively new phenomenon, but the history of the area and the communities 
that inhabit the area around Mount Lebanon stretches further back. It is difficult to choose a place to 
begin when describing Lebanese history, but it should be noted that the area was once home to the 
Phoenicians, a merchant people who thrived from trade in the Mediterranean and from the trade 
between Europe and Asia (Abukhalil 1998:6). The Phoenician people perished following various 
conquests of the area not least by the Romans and the Islamic Empires that followed the fall of 
Rome.
One of oldest religious groups living in Lebanon, the Maronite Christians, can be traced back to 
about 500 AD. Their ties to Rome came later, initially during the crusades, but it was not until the 
17th century that the Maronites aligned with Catholicism (McDowell 1996:8, Abukhalil 1998:6). 
Due to religious conviction, both Muslims and Orthodox Christians persecuted the Maronites, and 
as a result of this they fled to the slopes of Mount Lebanon where they found refuge (McDowell 
1996:8). 
During Colonialism
After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Turks quickly conquered most of the areas 
bordering the southern and eastern parts of the Mediterranean, including the area around Mount 
Lebanon (Abukhalil 1998:6). The Ottomans were, however, one of the more tolerant Empires of 
their day, and while only Sunni Muslims enjoyed special privileges all faiths were more or less 
acknowledged and tolerated (McDowell 1996:8, Abukhalil 1998:6). The present custom of 
confessionalism19 can be traced back to Ottoman rule, and as such it would seem to be an important 
part of Lebanese tradition (McDowell 1996:8, Reinkowski 1997:510). Thus this tradition in 
Lebanon of defining oneself according to religion is not a new phenomenon, but an inherent part of 
the political history of the country. During the period under Ottoman rule, the Maronites shared the 
area around Mount Lebanon with the Druze, a branch of the Shia Muslim faith, which later tore 
                                                
19 Definition: Confessionalistic means openly confessing/declaring where a candidate belongs. In the case of Lebanese 
democracy, religious sect is declared.
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itself away from the Shia. These groups coexisted, and together they enjoyed a relative degree of 
autonomy. 
Today the country is still divided into religious sects, and as will be discussed in chapter 5.2, the 
political system in Lebanon is based on these religious groups. According to Balibar, common 
language and common race is a fundamental foundation for the creation of a national identity and 
thereby national unity. The Lebanese share a common race and to some extent language and this 
may serve as a uniting factor. The problem with language is that although most Lebanese speak 
Arabic some Christians feel that Arabic is too closely tied to the Muslim faith and as a result some 
continue to speak French (Gilmour 1983:79). Thereby, the fact that the Arabic race and language 
are seen as connected to Islam by the Christians removes their unifying effect, and Lebanon is as a 
consequence left with neither. It is therefore difficult for the government to use these as tools to 
create unity, as Balibar suggests, cf. chapter 2.1. 
During the 19th century, the contest for power in the world between the great European powers also 
had an important impact on the Middle East, including Lebanon. During Egypt’s rebellion from 
Ottoman rule, Lebanon was occupied. Great Britain and Austro-Hungary intervened on behalf of 
Turkey, and Egypt was expelled. Control was handed back to Turkey, but with the demand that the 
area around Mount Lebanon was divided into a Christian section and a Muslim section, and that it 
was to be administered by a Christian Governor by the request of France. This may be where the 
foundation to the religious divide and conflict was laid, as war broke out between Maronites and 
Druze during the 1860’s despite the fact that they had coexisted peacefully for the past 300 years. 
The war was relatively short lived and differences between the two factions were set aside, but 
especially for the Maronites it sparked a growing fear of the Muslims. (McDowell 1996:9)
The Maronites sought a powerful partner in the contest with the various factions of Muslims. The 
Muslims had made ties to Great Britain who had been giving promises of helping the Arabs to rebel 
and make a Great Arab state. The Maronites established close ties with France, to whom they had 
had a traditionally good relationship. France in return put pressure on Ottoman Turkey to grant 
further autonomy to the Maronites. (Abukhalil 1998:7) After Turkey lost World War I in 1918, 
France was in 1920 given Syria, of which Lebanon was a part, by the League of Nations, to 
administrate as a French protectorate (McDowell 1996:10). While granting formal independence, 
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France kept tight control with the newly acquired areas. Due to their close ties with France, the 
Maronites were successful in having Greater Lebanon declare its formal independence from Syria, 
and in 1926 a Lebanese republic was formed under Maronite control and French dominance 
(Abukhalil 1998:7f). 
This caused problems, both with Christians and Muslims. Many Muslims in Lebanon felt a closer 
connection to Syria, mainly due to the fact that the Christians held all the power in Lebanon while 
the opposite was true in Syria. The division between Syria and Lebanon also had some economic 
repercussions, as the larger cities in the northern parts of Lebanon served mainly as gateways and 
places of trade between the coast and the Syrian hinterland. 
During the 1930’s the Maronite leadership started to prepare for a free and autonomous Lebanon. It 
was during this time that the unwritten Lebanese National Pact was formed. The leader of the 
Maronites, Bishara Khoury, deemed that Lebanon could only stay united if all factions remained 
loyal to the Lebanese state. Such a loyalty was difficult to guarantee due to the fact that many 
external actors and ideas appealed to the various factions, ranging from Syria or Pan-Arabic 
politicians to Socialism or most importantly religion. This was sought countered with the National 
Pact, in which it was implied that none of the factions were allowed to ally themselves with external 
forces (Abukhalil 1998:8, Reinkowski 1997:499). The National Pact was agreed on in 1943 in 
cooperation with the Sunnis, and the Sunni Riad Al Sulh was just as Khoury one of the main 
architects behind it (McDowell 1996:11). The Pact also entailed an agreement of a division of 
power between the tree major groups. Essentially the Presidential post would go to the Maronites, 
the Premiership to the Sunnis and the post of The Speaker of Parliament to the Shia Muslims 
(Abukhalil 1998:8f).
From Independence to Civil War
In 1943, Lebanon was granted full independence from France, who continued close relations with 
the Maronite dominated government. The exit of France led to the above-described division of 
power in the country to accommodate the many different groups, not all satisfied with Maronite 
domination. Following independence, political parties were formed, and most of them followed the 
religious divide, with the exception of a few that followed ideology instead, for example the 
Communists (McDowell 1996:12). Since seats in Parliament were allocated according to religion, 
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the new division of power continued the tradition of confessionalism, as all parties were required to 
declare their religious affiliation. 
During the 1950’s tensions between the groups were high, as the Maronite President tried to remain 
in office after the end of his term. The result was the Civil War of 1958 in which many rebelled 
against President Chamoun, including many Christians. The United States dispatched marines to 
Lebanon by the request of Chamoun. The Muslims widely regarded this request as a breach of the 
National Pact, while many Christians saw the Sunni Muslim contacts with the Egyptian President 
Nasser and his Pan-Arabic ideas as a breach as well. As the leader of the Lebanese armed forces 
General Shihab refused to use the army against the rebellion, and thus went against the President’s 
orders, a truce was worked out between the US and Egypt. General Shihab was seen as a figure of 
compromise, and because of this the truce made him the new President. (McDowell 1996:13, 
Abukhalil 1998:9)  
Especially the 1960’s are frequently described as the Golden Age of Lebanon and in particular 
Beirut. As we will discuss in chapter 6.3, the pre-war period is still remembered with nostalgia 
(Haugbølle 2005:194). The most common phrase used to describe the capital was as the Paris of the 
Middle East, in part because of the city’s obvious wealth seen in architecture and infrastructure, and 
in part due to the liberal nature of the city, which was uncommon for a major city in that region. 
Beirut had achieved this status thanks to its role as an important trade centre. (McDowell 1996:12f) 
However, it would seem a mistake to presume that the rest of the country shared the wealth of 
Beirut. As a cause for the war scholars like Social Anthropologist Are Knudsen20 and Dr. Caroline 
Nagel21 have pointed to the obvious underdevelopment of the rest of the country (Knudsen 2005:1, 
Nagel 2002). Industry and agriculture only made up a fraction of the economy, and the bulk of cash 
entering the country flowed through Beirut but not beyond. (McDowell 1996:13) This led to 
considerable economic inequality, and the fact that many Muslims lived in the rural areas, 
furthermore gave this divide a religious dimension. It is interesting that this same inequality is still 
evident today, and that almost all investment is made in Beirut and the rebuilding of the city. 
                                                
20 Knudsen is a Social Anthropologist who is currently working for the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Norway. His areas of 
expertise include conflict resolution, peace building and patronage in the Middle East. (Webpage 11) 
21 Dr. Nagel is a lecturer of Geography at University of California, Berkeley and University of Colorado, Boulder. Her 
area of expertise is urbanisation and especially the reconstruction of Beirut. (Webpage 12) 
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Moving just a few kilometres outside the city centre, the poverty is alarmingly evident (Knudsen 
2005:5). This paradox and the process of restructuring Beirut will be discussed in chapter 6.3.  
The fact that Lebanon was a liberal country when comparing it to its neighbours in the Arab world 
meant that other countries and organisations in the region used the free speech and free press in 
Lebanon to further their agenda. This activity was widespread during the early 1970’s and it seems 
to have had amplified the differences between the groups internally in Lebanon. (McDowell 
1996:13) 
As evident from the above written, the various religious groups in Lebanon shared the country for 
many hundreds of years without major incidents. This can be seen as an illustration that the factions 
can live side by side. However, one must take into account the fact that for large parts of this period, 
Lebanon was dominated by an outside force, either Ottoman Turkey or France, who for the most 
part was able to quell any disorder. The absence of such an overlord may have been another factor, 
which triggered the civil war. 
The Palestinians
Following the various wars between Israel and its Arab neighbours, not including Lebanon, the 
number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon increased considerably, especially after the Arab-Israeli 
war of 1967 (McDowall 1996:8). Palestinians settled in large refugee camps, almost small towns, 
by themselves, which added to the political tensions in the country. The Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) started to operate from the Lebanese borderlands in December 1975, crossing 
the border to Israel and conducting guerrilla strikes on Israeli targets, and subsequently retreating to 
safety behind the border. Unwilling to invade an Arab country without due cause and especially one 
with traditional close ties to the west, Israel responded to the situation by launching commando 
raids of their own into Lebanon (McDowell 1996:14, Rabinovich 1985:86). One of these resulted in 
the destruction of 13 airliners from various Arab airlines in Beirut’s airport. Israel regarded the 
Palestinian attacks on Israel as a Lebanese problem, since they were carried out from Lebanese 
territory and it was the Lebanese government’s job to stop such actions (Abukhalil 1998:9). 
The Lebanese government was paralysed and unable to handle the situation. Since the government 
itself was a union between the different factions, and was deeply divided, no actions were taken 
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against either the Palestinians or Israel. (Abukhalil 1998:10) The PLO’s influence in Lebanon 
quickly grew, and was with the Cairo Agreement of 1969 granted control of the southern parts of 
Lebanon from where they could continue the fight with Israel, in exchange that they recognised the 
area as Lebanese (McDowell 1996:14).
The Decline and Collapse of the Government and the Political System
The Palestinian situation had severely weakened the internal cooperation in the Lebanese 
government and the election of Hamid Franjiyyah, who has been referred to as a Maronite 
hardliner, as President hardly contributed to a solution of this stalemate. On the contrary, Franjiyyah 
granted government funding and support to the Maronite militias attempting to combat the 
Palestinians. (Abukhalil 1998:10f)
At this point, faith in the government’s ability to run the country properly was at an all time low. 
President after President had been forced to leave office after attempting to remain in office longer 
than permitted, and at the same time these Presidents had had a reputation for extensive corruption. 
As the office of the Presidency was marred by such a reputation, the election of Franjiyyah only 
underlined Lebanon’s problems. (Abukhalil 1998:9) As already noted, the country was divided 
concerning what to do with the Palestinians, and this reflected upon the government. The 
consociational division22 of power between the factions, which meant that the Maronites held the 
majority of power, since the President’s office was the dominant, also encouraged additional 
tension, as the Maronites no longer were the largest group. In fact, the Christians were a minority23
and thus held an un-proportional large amount of power compared to the Sunnis and the Shia. The 
number of Muslims had increased considerably over the years, partly because of a higher birth rate, 
and the Shia Muslims had become the single largest group, something that is still the case today. 
(Abukhalil 1998:10, McDowall 1996:8ff, CIA Factbook)  
The Civil War
Although it can be difficult to pinpoint when civil strife turned to civil war, it is believed that the 
killing of 27 Palestinians by a Christian militia who were against their presence in a particular 
neighbourhood of Beirut in April 1975 (Abukhalil 1998:xix), was what initiated the war. At that 
                                                
22 This kind of political system will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.2.
23 By using the word ‘minority’ in this context, we just imply that the group was one of many groups, which were 
numerously too small to gain absolute majority in a political system.
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point many Lebanese felt alienated from the Franjiyyah-administration which, as mentioned earlier, 
had a reputation for being corrupt. Initially, two wings were formed, both consisting mainly of the 
extremists, while more moderate Lebanese attempted to stay out of the fighting. The various 
Maronite militias formed the first wing, The Lebanese Front, which was determined to keep the 
status quo. Meanwhile, the Muslims, both Sunni and Shia, and some Christian Orthodox formed the 
other, The National Front, who demanded reform and a de-confessionalisation of the political 
system. (McDowell 1996:14, Rigby 2000:11) 
Even though the Palestinians in many ways were not only one of the causes of the outbreak of war 
but also one of the participants, it was not until late 1975 that PLO decided to join the fray (Rigby 
2000:11). At that point, the Maronites were gaining the upper hand and the PLO deemed this to be 
undesirable since the Maronite militias were the strongest opposition to Palestinian presence and 
activities. This move only served to escalate the conflict. 
After 1975, the cleavages between the groups became even more intractable, and each faction 
developed its own militia. Most groups had the backing of external patrons like Syria, Iraq, Israel or 
Iran (Mcdowall 1996:15ff). By the end of 1976, each militia had managed to ‘cleanse’ a territory, 
which they claimed to be their own, and during the war around 500.000 people were forced to move 
(Rigby 2000:11f, UNDP Webpage 1) Today, there is still a large number of displaced people in 
Lebanon, and as mentioned the government has developed a Ministry of Displaced which is to help 
people move back. This will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.2. 
As the civil war continued, some of the communities experienced the emergence of counter elites, 
who had their own militias. This resulted in large scale fighting within the communities, adding 
another dimension to the war. (Rigby 2000:12) From 1975 until 1989, there was a constant state of 
instability in Lebanon with periods marked by full scale fighting. During the war, numerous war 
crimes were committed and the list includes human-rights violations and brutal massacres. 
(Knudsen 2005:1, 12) The atrocities were committed by all sides, and it left the country both in 
economic and social ruin. 
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The Ta’if Accord
During the civil war, there have been numerous attempted solutions and peace agreements, which 
all failed (Collings 1994:17ff, Rigby 2000:12ff). In 1989, however, the Saudis stepped in and took 
over the peace talks. A Tripartite Arab High Commission was made, comprising the leaders of 
Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Algeria, leaving out Syria. However, Syria did have influence on the 
accord as it was modelled on a prior 1985 Syrian sponsored agreement. Only in the final stage of 
negotiations did the Commission invite Lebanese deputies to the negotiation. A meeting was held in 
Ta’if in Saudi Arabia in September 1989 where the deputies were presented with a draft of the 
agreement. (Collings 1994:33, Rigby 2000:14) These deputies attempted to change some of the 
parts of the accord, especially the parts about the relationship between Lebanon and Syria, but were 
told that: “…the treaty was a whole and had to be either accepted or rejected in its entirety.”
(Collings 1994:38).
The Ta’if Accord, which was know as Charter of National Reconciliation, was accepted in Lebanon 
as an amendment to the 1926 Lebanese constitution (Collings 1994:31f). The main purpose of the 
agreement was to satisfy the groups and stop them from fighting, by dividing the power between 
them. As such, the political system proposed in the accord differs little from the system before the 
war. Again the system is based on power sharing, attempting to give each group a proportional 
share of power according to their size. The accord values procedures where every community has 
its own veto. This is also in accordance with Lebanon’s political tradition, and the unwritten 
National Pact from 1943, where all the various communities always have shared power. This was 
done to keep peace within the country, and the accord is often seen as the only thing holding the 
country together. (Collings 1994:31f) 
However, the accord changed the power structure between the President, the Prime Minister and the 
Speaker of Parliament transferring power from the President to the two others, thereby weakening 
the Christian influence24. The division of power between the groups in Parliament has also shifted 
in the agreement distributing power equally between the Muslims and the Christians. This abolishes 
the Christian majority in Parliament, which existed before the war. This method of dividing power 
has been criticised for being precarious as the demographic picture in Lebanon changes. Some 
believe this is the reason why the war started in the first place (McDowall 1996:11f). The newest 
                                                
24 As mentioned before, the President in Lebanon is always a Maronite Christian, in accordance with the 1943 National 
Pact. 
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estimates say, that the division between the Muslims and the Christians is 59.7% to 39% and not 
50/50 as stipulated in the Ta’if Accord (CIA Factbook, Ta’if Accord 1989:2). In chapter 5.1 we will 
analyse the Ta’if Accord and discuss how it influences the process of reconciliation in Lebanon. 
4.2 Lebanon Today
The Implementation of the Ta’if Accord and the Political System 
Following the legislation from the Ta’if Accord, the Lebanese government is now divided into an 
executive branch, which holds the President, who is the Chief of State, and the Prime Minister, who 
is the Head of Government, and a legislative branch, which holds the Parliament25. As mentioned 
earlier, there has been an unwritten agreement between the groups in Lebanon, since 1943, that the 
three most prominent posts in government should go to the three largest communities. 
Consequently, even today the presidential post is occupied by the Maronite Christian Emile 
Lahoud, the Prime Minister is the Sunni Muslim Fouad Siniora and the Speaker of Parliament is the 
Shia Muslim Nabih Berri. (Wikipedia Webpage 1)
The Parliament appoints the President and the President appoints the Prime Minister. The Cabinet is 
chosen by the Prime Minister in consultation with the President and members of the Parliament 
(CIA Factbook). However, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers must at all times retain 
the confidence of a majority in the Parliament (Wikipedia Webpage 1). Thus, these three parts of 
government function as a power troika, where each part never can make a decision without 
consultation with the two others, and they each have veto power over the others. The purpose of this 
is to make sure that all major groups have influence on all matters, but the system has been 
criticised for causing a stalemate in political decisions and making the state weak. (Safa 2006:27) 
Balibar also talks of this, when he says that it is important to have an effective state apparatus in 
order to create unity. If the Lebanese state is weak, an effective state apparatus is difficult to obtain, 
and this is indeed the case in Lebanon, as we will discuss later.
The seats in the parliament are distributed according to religious affiliation, so that it is equally 
balanced between the Christians and the Muslims, following the Ta’if Accord. Below is a table of 
the allocation of seats in Parliament between the religious communities before and after the accord. 
                                                
25 The Parliament is in Lebanon called the Chamber of Deputies, but to increase understanding we will refer to it as the 
Parliament in this project. 
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Parliament of Lebanon Seat Allocation
Confession Before Ta’if After Ta’if
Maronite 30 34
Greek Orthodox 11 14
Greek Catholic 6 8
Armenian Orthodox 4 5
Armenian Catholic 1 1
Protestant 1 1
Other Christians 1 1
Total Christians 54 64
Sunni 20 27
Shi'a 19 27
Druze 6 8
Alawite 0 2
Total Muslims 45 64
TOTAL 99 128
Table 1 (Wikipedia Webpage 2) 
Since the Ta’if Accord, there have been four elections in Lebanon (Webpage 13), and none of them 
have been internationally recognized as being free and fair (Salem 1994:7ff). The total voter turnout 
was 30% in 1992, 45% in 1996 and 40% in 2000. The latest elections in May 2005 were the freest 
in Lebanon, since the civil war, with a voter turnout of approximately 50%. (Safa 2006:34, Knudsen 
2005:9) Although this number might sound low when compared to voter turnouts in Western 
democracies, the fact that half the population voted can be seen as an indicator that there actually is 
support for the regime and for the Lebanese nation as such. 
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According to some critics, all the post-war elections have violated the Ta’if Accord. At each 
election, a new election law was used. Moreover, the new large governorates, which should 
constitute the constituencies or the one large national constituency as proposed in the Ta’if Accord, 
have not yet been implemented and the voting is still done along the small district lines. This can 
make voting according to religious affiliation easier, as the election campaigns focuses on the local 
issues instead of the national ones. This can also make it more difficult to gain central state 
authority. Besides this, the sectarian system is still in place today, although the accord suggested 
plans for its abolishment. At the election in 2000, the dominantly pro-Syrian Parliament changed 
the election law to alter the constituencies so there would be a majority of Muslim voters in each 
constituency. They were criticised for doing this to secure seats for pro-Syrian parties and 
politicians. This same system was still in place at the 2005 election, and especially the Christian 
communities have protested it. (Knudsen 2005:8, Safa 2006:35) Generally, the electoral law has 
been the object of many discussions and disagreements in Lebanon. The Ta’if Accord states that the 
Parliament should pass a new law, which is free of sectarian restriction, but it will probably be 
difficult for the factions to agree upon this issue (Knudsen 2005:9, Ta’if Accord 1989:1). One of the 
reasons for this is the fact that there are so many factions in Lebanon and that each has at least one 
political party. Additionally, one could imagine that the smaller religious groups do not trust the 
larger to rule democratically but are afraid that they will be marginalised. 
The Political Parties
Subsequently, Lebanon has many political parties. However, they play a less significant role in 
Lebanese politics than they do in most other parliamentary democracies. Many of the parties are 
simply lists of candidates endorsed by a prominent national or local figure. Loose coalitions are 
formed for electoral purposes by negotiations among clan leaders26, and candidates representing 
various religious communities. Such coalitions usually exist only for the election, and rarely form a 
cohesive bloc in the Parliament after the election. (Wikipedia Webpage 3) At the 2005 
parliamentary election in Lebanon, there were three major coalitions, which dominated the political 
scene (Safa 2006:23). 
The current ruling coalition is the Rafiq Hariri Martyr List, also called March 14 Alliance. This list 
is made up of seven parties and some individuals and controls 72 of the Parliament’s 128 seats. 
                                                
26 These clan leaders and the network they have created in Lebanon will be discussed later.
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However, the coalition is not big enough to make constitutional amendments and is therefore forced 
to cooperate with the opposition. All of the parties on the list are predominantly anti-Syrian and 
against the current President Lahoud, who is seen as a Syrian puppet. The largest party on the list is 
the Future Movement with 36 seats in parliament. This party is led by Saad Hariri who is the son of 
the assassinated former Prime Minister Hariri. This party has followers both from the Sunni, 
Maronite, Orthodox, Catholic and Armenian communities. (Safa 2006:23,  Wikipedia Webpage 4) 
The list also consists of the Progressive Socialist Party, which got 16 seats in Parliament and is 
made up of mostly Druze followers. The party is led by Walid Jumblatt, who is the son of the, now 
assassinated, founder Kamal Jumblatt, and has since 1989 been in opposition to Syria. Under Kamal 
Jumblatt, the party was outspokenly in favour of a Lebanese Arab identity and supported the 
Palestinians. During the war, the party turned into one of the strongest militias in the country and 
controlled most of Mount Lebanon. (Knudsen 2005:7, Safa 2006:23) Another party on this list is 
the Lebanese Forces, which were a very active militia during the war, but has now converted into a 
political party with 6 seats in Parliament (Wikipedia Webpage 5). The party is mostly Christian, and 
on its webpage the party underlines the Christian origin of the country (Webpage 14). The last 
larger party on this list is the Qornet Shehwan Gathering with six seats. This gathering consists of 
the two Christian parties; the Kataeb Party and the National Liberal Party. The Kataeb Party was a 
close ally of Israel during the war, and is now outspokenly against Lahoud (Webpage 15). However, 
the National Liberal Party has now left this gathering. 
The second alliance at the 2005 election was the Resistance and Development Bloc, which is mostly 
Shia. This is the largest opposition bloc to the ruling coalition (Safa 2006:23). The largest party in 
this bloc is the Amal Movement with 15 seats in Parliament. Unlike Hizbollah, this party does not 
call for an Islamic state in Lebanon, but wishes respect for the Shia Muslims in Lebanon and fairer 
distribution of resources to the South of the country. Amal has been a loyal supporter of Syria and 
did not take part in the Cedar Revolution after Hariri’s death. The party now has the Speaker of 
Parliament, Berri. (Wikipedia Webpage 6) The other major party on this list is the Shia Islamist 
party Hizbollah, which has 14 seats in Parliament. The party was a militia during the war and used 
its Iranian and Syrian training and support to attack Israeli occupying troops in the South. It was 
declared largely responsible for driving Israel out of Lebanon and still commanding a large armed 
wing, Hizbollah eventually began to act as a mainstream political movement with a large network 
of schools, orphanages, and clinics. It now receives respect among nearly all Lebanese, and its 
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popularity among Shia Muslims is immense, although it has been deemed a terrorist group by the 
United States. Having never been involved in intra-Lebanese infighting, Hizbollah elicits trust even 
though its military wing refuses to adhere to UN’s requests to disarm, citing continued Israeli 
presence on a piece of disputed borderland known as the Sheba'a Farms. (Knudsen 2005:7, Safa 
2006:28, UN Security Council Resolution 1559, 2004) During the war Amal and Hizbollah fought 
each other but they have now joined forces to prevent splitting the Shia vote (Knudsen 2005:7). 
The last coalition is the Aoun Alliance, which is dominated by the Free Patriotic Movement with 14 
seats in Parliament. The party mostly consists of members from the Christian community, but also 
has Muslim supporters because it declares itself as the only secular party in Lebanon. The leader of 
the party is former military general Maronite Michel Aoun. In 1990, Syrian forces forced Aoun into 
exile because of his opposition against Syria and his close cooperation with Saddam Hussein. He 
returned to Lebanon in 2005 after 15 years of exile in Paris. (Wikipedia Webpage 7,  Wikipedia 
Webpage 8, Yalibnan 2005, Safa 2006:23) The party has declared it as its purpose to keep the 
balance between the two other coalitions in Parliament, which are fiercely anti-, and pro-Syrian. 
Although Aoun himself is anti-Syrian the rest of the members in the coalition are of mixed 
preferences. (BBC Webpage 1)
Current Issues
Corruption and ‘Zauma Clientelism’
In many ways the political system in Lebanon is influenced by old clans and families and by a 
special Lebanese type of patron-client relationship called ‘zuama clientelism’27. This system can be 
traced back to feudal times in Lebanon, where the overlord allowed peasants and their families the 
use of land in exchange for unquestioned loyalty. Today, this social system has become a political 
system where the overlord now is a political leader, or a ‘zaim’. The peasants have become the 
zaim’s constituents, and, instead of land, favours like jobs, security, schooling, medical care etc. are 
exchanged for electoral loyalty. Although this clientelism is rooted in the rural areas, it is now 
common in towns and large cities as well. (Federal Research Division 1987, Knudsen 2005:3) 
These networks were especially important for people during the war when the state collapsed and 
the communities had to take services into their own hands. However, even today 15 years after the 
                                                
27 Zuama is plural for zaim. 
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end of the war there is still no publicly funded social safety net for the poor, making these networks 
of safety continued relevant. (Knudsen 2005:3) Providing service and safety for the communities is 
an important task for the zuama as this is what they have to trade for the loyalty of their members. 
Therefore, they might not be willing to relinquish the task to the government, if the government did 
have the resources to undertake it. The zuama are still the main providers of this safety net, but 
some of the services have now been taken over by militias like Amal, Hizbollah and the Lebanese 
Forces (Federal Research Division 1987). 
This network can be translated into Balibar’s theory when he talks about non-national state 
apparatuses (Balibar 1991:88). According to Balibar, these non-national state apparatuses were 
originally made by the bourgeoisies in Europe and we argues that they can now be seen in 
Lebanon’s tradition of the zuama families. Balibar states that they: “…have been involuntarily 
‘nationalized’ and have begun to nationalize society …” (Balibar 1991:88). These families can also 
be understood as the elites of Lebanon in that they have the capital and power to control the 
members of their affiliation. Due to their power, they are capable of political, religious and cultural 
hegemony, which is Balibar’s definition of the elite. (Balibar 1991:90) Balibar further argues that 
there is a risk that these non-national state apparatus will become cemented in society (Balibar 
1991:88). The problem in relation to creating a national unity in Lebanon is that the different zuama 
produce only their form of nationalism. It is difficult for the government to integrate all the different 
forms of nationalism into a unified one if the government lacks its people’s dependency. (Balibar 
1991:92) We argue that only once the state is capable of exercising the social services itself and 
thus make the society dependent, can it produce a common national unity throughout the 
population. Of course, this depends on whether or not the different religious groups in the 
government can agree upon a collective idea of the nation. 
Another problem with the zuama system is that is controls the schools and the curriculum. In order 
to achieve national unity it seems preferable that certain institutions within the Lebanese state 
attempts to help produce a common unifying sentiment or memory. According to Balibar, the 
school system is an important tool in achieving this, as it in this case would enable the state to 
indoctrinate new Lebanese to feel Lebanese (Balibar 1991:102f). It would require that the 
curriculum was the same all over the country so that the same information was conveyed, the same 
national unity produced. Such a unity would and should probably be constructed along those parts 
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of Lebanese history, which would serve to underline their unity or their common heritage, like 
Anderson suggests (Andersen 1983:201). However, in Lebanon there is no common agreement on 
which parts of history should be focused on and even if there were, there is still the problem that the 
zuama decide the curriculum, which means that widely different identities and national images are 
reproduced. The government is presently not powerful enough to challenge this position of the 
zuama, not in the least since the zuama under the present system are present in the government as 
well. As an example illustrating this, a common history book was written but never used as the 
factions could not agree on which parts of Lebanese history were important, and in several cases 
what had actually happened (El-Masri 2005:20f). 
There are other problems with the zuama system. First of all, it is corrupt and it is probably the 
reason why Lebanon’s corruption perception index was 3.1 in 2005, and why the country was 
placed number 83 on Transparency International’s list of 158 countries (Knudsen 2005:4, TI 
Corruption Perception Index 2005). Furthermore, the system also exits in government, and this is 
why many people do not trust the parties and the politicians due to their history of self-enrichment 
(Knudsen 2005:4). A further problem with this system is the fact that people are cut off from social 
services from their zaim if they do not have a vote to trade. This is the case for many poor people 
because the election law states, that people must vote in the city where they were born and not in 
the city where they live. Therefore, a lot of poor and displaced people, who are unable to travel, 
cannot vote or receive clientelistic favours such as jobs or schooling from any zaim. (Knudsen 
2005:9) 
Other kinds of corruption in Lebanon include the unwritten practice that in order to participate in 
the elections and appear on one of the party lists one has to pay or promise large sums of money to 
the main political figure on the list. Some of the Members of Parliament still inherit their seats 
through family lines, and in spite of the four elections since 1989 there has been almost no change 
in the composition of Parliament. This is contributing to the popular mistrust in the political system. 
(Knudsen 2005:8) One of the main reasons for this prevalent corruption in Lebanon is the extensive 
poverty in the country, since the poor people are dependent on the zuama. 
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Poverty
Lebanon has received minimal aid and grants from donor countries, and has instead based their 
development on loans, which has caused a huge foreign dept. (Knudsen 2005:19) During the war, 
the inequality in the Lebanese society increased. In 1998, one third of Lebanon’s population were 
living under the poverty line. The recovery of the county’s economy in the post-war period has not 
benefited the poor, and in 2003 the unofficial rate of unemployment was 30%. (Knudsen 2005:5) 
Beirut has a large share of the poor people, and Southern Beirut is called the ‘misery belt’ because 
of the great poverty there (Knudsen 2005:5, Irin News 2006). Most of the poor are Muslims, and 
especially the Shia Muslims are marginalised (Knudsen 2005:3). This inequality and the bad 
economical situation in general are important issues to address if there is to be hope of 
reconciliation and unity (Brounéus 2003:23). 
Almost all investment in Lebanon is made in Beirut and the Mount Lebanon region, which 
increases the inequality between the rural and urban regions. Hariri’s firm Solidere is currently 
reconstructing Beirut city and transforming it into a Middle Eastern Hong Kong, but just a few 
kilometres outside of the city centre lay the impoverished suburbs, where there is no electricity or 
paved roads and health care is provided by volunteers, NGOs and the zuama. The people who live 
in these suburbs are mostly migrants from rural areas, and because of the election law, they can 
only vote in the city where they were born. Therefore, they are not able to make changes through 
the political system in their residential area. (Knudsen 2005:3, Irin News 2006) 
Syrian Influence on Lebanese Politics 
Another current issue in Lebanon is the relationship with Syria. The Ta’if Accord cemented the ties 
between Lebanon and Syria, describing them as brother nations. It furthermore endorsed the 
presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon, by avoiding setting a definitive date of withdrawal (Ta’if 
Accord 1989:7). Most agree that Syria has played a major role in Lebanese politics in the post-war 
period, but it has mainly been done through the Syrian intelligence units and is therefore difficult to 
detect. It is however curious, that the political parties in Lebanon in the post-war period have 
prospered according to whether they were pro-Syrian or not. Similarly, it is also interesting that the 
Maronite vocal opposition to the Syrian presence in 2001 led to the imprisoning or exiling of many 
of the leaders of the Christian parties, and their members. (Knudsen 2005:6ff) The Syrian 
intelligence has been suspected of manipulating the electoral law to secure pro-Syrian candidates 
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and another suspicious event was the three-year extension of pro-Syrian President Lahoud’s term in 
office (Knudsen 2005:11, Salem 1994).
There are different theories about the Syrian preoccupation with controlling Lebanon. One theory 
argues it has to do with wishes of reviving the former ‘Greater Syria’, while others point out the 
economical factor. Lebanon’s gross national product and their per capita income were in 2003 both 
three times that of Syria’s, and this makes Lebanon an important marked for Syrian products and 
unskilled labour. Under Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, trade agreements were made between the 
countries, which favoured Syrian exports and especially hurt the Lebanese agricultural sector. 
(Knudsen 2005:11, Safa 2006:27) Furthermore, between 300.000 and 1.4 million Syrians resided in 
Lebanon under the occupation, however, many have returned to Syria after Hariri’s death because 
of fear of persecution (Knudsen 2005:12).
The Parliaments elected in 1992, 1996 and 2000 were all made up of pro-Syrian majorities (Safa 
2006:27) Apart from some Christian opposition, there has mainly been indifference toward the 
question of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon since the Ta’if Accord (Knudsen 2005:12). Yet, with the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which underlined: “…the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese 
forces from Lebanon …” (UN Security Council Resolution 1559, 2004) the issue appeared on the 
international agenda. This was greatly enforced with the assassination of Hariri and the event of the 
Cedar Revolution, as described below.
Hariri was a powerful man in Lebanese politics. He served as Prime Minister from 1992-98 and 
2000-04 (Knudsen 2005:4), and he was outspokenly anti-Syrian (Safa 2006:29). As mentioned 
above, his family owns the private reconstruction company, Solidere, and it was hired by the 
government in 1993 to rebuild Beirut through the US $ 20 billion reconstruction programme 
Horizon 2000 (Nagel 2002, Knudsen 2005:5). Hariri was a successful business contractor and made 
business with international elites. For example, he was known by the royal family in Saudi Arabia 
where he made a fortune working as a contractor (Salem 1994). The Hariri family owns a bank, 
Banque de Méditerranée, and holds major stakes in other banks, they also own a TV-station, Future 
Television, and a newspaper. On the one hand, Hariri set up a charity foundation using his own 
fortune, which increased his popularity with the population. On the other hand, there was suspicion 
of widespread corruption under his tenure. (Knudsen 2005:4) Hariri thus functioned as a Sunni 
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patron, not only for Beirut but for Lebanon itself (Salem 1994, Knudsen 2005:4). The family still 
has this zaim position, however, they now lack Hariri’s unifying personality. 
Hariri’s determination to rebuild and unify Lebanon, his opposition to Syrian occupation, and his 
veto of decisions made by pro-Syrian President Lahoud, made him a threat for the Syrian rulers 
(Safa 2006:28). He was assassinated in a car bomb on the 14th of February 2005, and suspicion 
immediately fell on Syria. This gave rise to massive spontaneous peaceful demonstrations in Beirut 
on March 14th 2005, not formerly seen in Lebanon, or in the Middle East28. Sunnis, Christians and 
Druzes united to demonstrate their anger at the assassination and their demand for the truth behind 
the event (Safa 2006:22, 30, 37, BBC Webpage 2). The demonstrations were peaceful, and 
participants: “…greeted the soldiers with flowers, sweets and choruses of friendly singing.” (Safa 
2006:32). Even the media backed the event and ran interviews and stories supporting the 
demonstrations, which is uncommon for Middle Eastern media, which is usually controlled by the 
government (Safa 2006:32). The event was called the ‘Cedar Revolution’ by the West because the 
banners held at the demonstrations carried the Cedar tree from the Lebanese flag, and not the usual 
symbols from the different sects. The Lebanese called it the ‘Uprising for Independence’ (BBC 
Webpage 3). Some believe that these demonstrations “…underlined the country’s unity” (Knudsen 
2005:4, Safa 2006:31). 
The Cedar Revolution in Lebanon can be seen as proof that unity under certain circumstances is 
possible. The demonstration made by the Sunnis, the Christians and the Druzes was only possible 
because they were united by an external enemy. This coincides with Balibar’s debate about the 
necessary external frontiers and the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ which need to be more 
important than the internal differences as it enables people to feel at home, as discussed in chapter 
2.3 (Balibar 1991:95). Anderson also agrees that the imagining of the nation is influenced by its 
limitation, which is made up of the external frontiers, and in Lebanon this could be seen in the unity 
formed around the notion of being Lebanese, as opposed to Syrian. But this official display of unity 
was brief and fragile. 
                                                
28 Photos from these demonstrations can be seen on our front page.
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Interviews with participants in the demonstration also suggest that there was a spirit of unity and 
allegiance between the participators during the demonstrations, but this disappeared when the call 
for elections came. Nader Nakib, who was an activist during the demonstrations, said: 
As soon as we started talking about elections, everything fell apart. Everyone started thinking of himself, his 
own party or agenda. And in Lebanon, because the parties are confessional, when the parties fight, the sects start 
fighting. (BBC Webpage 2)
There were, however, also counterdemonstrations especially by Shia Muslims, led by Hizbollah and 
Amal, showing support for Syria in Lebanon. Interestingly the counterdemonstrations also carried 
banners with the Lebanese flag, suggesting a somewhat support of the idea of Lebanese unity, as the 
flag is not usually used by the Shia Muslims. (Safa 2006:33) 
Pressure on Syria increased with the murder of Hariri, as popular calls followed for the complete 
withdrawal of Syrian troops and intelligence operatives from Lebanon (Safa 2006:31). Interim 
reports from a UN investigation into the assassination, implicates top Syrian and Lebanese officials 
(BBC Webpage 3, Daily Star Webpage 1). Two months after the assassination, the pro-Syrian 
government in Lebanon collapsed and the Syrian troops withdrew (BBC Webpage 2). It has been 
more difficult to verify the dismantling of the Syrian intelligence apparatus in Lebanon, and some 
suggest Syria still has a hidden presence and influence in the country (Knudsen 2005:11). 
The National Dialogue
In March 2006 representatives from the different parties in Lebanon held a conference to discuss 
some of the current issues of national importance. This conference was named the National 
Dialogue, and four sessions have currently been held. There are three issues, which are high on the 
National Dialogue agenda at the time of writing. 
The first is the controversy about the Lebanese President Lahoud, who had his term in office 
prolonged during the Syrian occupation. President Lahoud is, as mentioned earlier, a Maronite 
Christian who is pro-Syrian, and after Syria withdrew from the country last year, there has been 
mounting pressure from anti-Syrian fractions for him to step down from his post. But Lahoud is not 
willing to do so. Currently, he does not have the backing of a majority of the Parliament, and 
Lahoud and the Sunni Prime Minister, Siniora, are not on speaking terms at the moment (Daily Star 
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Webpage 2).  The National Dialogue is discussing the future of the President and the possibility of a 
presidential election soon (Webpage 16, Daily Star Webpage 3). Considering how the former 
elections have been executed, a new would be interesting to follow. 
The second topic, which is on the political agenda, is the question of Hizbollah and the UN’s wish 
for them to disarm. The resolution: “Calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and 
non-Lebanese militias.” (UN Security Council Resolution 1559, 2004). Many in Lebanon do not 
view Hizbollah as a militia, but as a resistance army (Knudsen 2005:19, Webpage 16). The Arab 
League has recently granted Hizbollah the right: “…to liberate the occupied Lebanese territories 
from the Israeli enemy.” (Daily Star Webpage 2). However, the pressure from the UN makes it an 
issue the Lebanese government cannot afford not to take seriously. 
The third area of debate discussed at the National Dialogue conference, is the strained relations with 
the county’s former occupier Syria. Official talks between the two countries have yet to resume 
after the Syrian troops were withdrawn from Lebanon last year (Daily Star Webpage 2). The 
Speaker of Parliament, Berri, has announced: 
Participants [in the National Dialogue, red] want relations between Lebanon and Syria to be as equals, based on 
the establishment of diplomatic relations and embassies and demarcation of Lebanese-Syrian frontiers. 
(Webpage 16)
Time will tell whether Syria harbours the same wish for diplomatic relations with its neighbour. 
The fourth area discussed is the Palestinian question. There are currently 350.000 Palestinian
refugees living in refugee camps in Lebanon. These Palestinians are predominantly Sunni Muslims, 
and they are not active on the domestic political scene. This is because they lack any civic rights, 
meaning they can neither work, get higher education or vote. (Knudsen 2005:14) Nonetheless, they 
constitute an important minority whose settlement in Lebanon is vigorously opposed by most 
Lebanese, who see them as a threat to Lebanon's delicate confessional balance (Wikipedia Webpage 
3). Of all Lebanese, only Hizbollah supports the refugees and speak for their rights. Almost all 
others agree that they should never get any rights (Knudsen 2005:14). Some blame the Palestinians 
for starting the civil war cf. our previous chapter about the origin of the conflict (Knudsen 2005:14). 
Like Hizbollah, some groups of Palestinian refugees are still armed. They also refuse to disarm, in 
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spite of UN’s resolution number 1559 (UN Security Council Resolution 1559, 2004, Knudsen 
2005:15). 
Although this National Dialogue does not discuss issues and events from the war, it is still a good 
forum for the groups to meet and discuss their disagreements. Maybe the hope for future unity 
should be found in what is not on the political agenda. None of the groups are presently discussing 
wishes to break free from Lebanon and obtain their own state. This can be seen as an indication of 
support for the idea of a united Lebanon. 
Professors William J. Long and Peter Brecke29 believe that political reconciliation events are 
important. They mention meetings between factions, like this Dialogue in Lebanon. They have 
made a study of all countries with civil war in the 20th century and found that 64% of the ones who 
had these events never went back into war. Only 9% of those countries, which did not have these 
events, did not go back to war. (Brounéus 2003:25) So the National Dialogue in Lebanon might be 
a step in the right direction. Also Lijphart, who we will refer to later, notes that successful power 
sharing is more likely to occur if the elites of the various groups interact with each other. 
(Schneckener 2002:216)
                                                
29 Long and Brecke are both Professors at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs in Georgia (Webpage 17). 
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5 The Political Framework for Reconciliation and Unity
Before we can start to analyse and discuss the initiatives the government has started in order to 
achieve reconciliation and national unity, we need to examine the political framework in which the 
government is operating. It is therefore necessary to analyse the Ta’if Accord on which the political 
system in Lebanon is based. As mentioned before, the accord is also referred to as the Charter of 
National Reconciliation (Knudsen 2005:2), and thereby the goal of reconciliation is set. We argue 
below that this accord imposes a form of power sharing, and we will discuss whether or not this 
constitutes a challenge for the government’s work towards unity. 
Of the various forms of power sharing, Consociationalism is the most used method of post civil war 
regulation. Consociationalism has been used in several conflicts with a varying degree of success. 
(El-Masri 2005:2f) This kind of power sharing seeks to regulate a conflict rather than actually solve 
it. Such regulation is achieved by guaranteeing the various factions influence on the government 
according to their size, and by giving the various factions some degree of autonomy.   
5.1 The Accord
The system of power sharing used in the Ta’if Accord shares many principles with 
Consociationalism. In the following, excerpts from the Ta’if Accord will illustrate this connection 
and thus further the understanding of the war and the post-war problems. It should, however, be 
noted, that the sectarian elite-oriented nature of Lebanese politics can be traced back several 
hundred years, and as such is highly integrated in Lebanese political culture cf. chapter 4.1. 
Furthermore, this practice was fundamental to French control of Lebanon and to the following 
National Pact, which guaranteed Maronite independence. The Ta’if Accord, despite its promises of 
dismantling the sectarian system in the future, codifies this practice. A primary role of the Ta’if 
Accord is to signal that Lebanon is no longer divided. 
Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled to live in and enjoy any part 
of the country under the supremacy of the law. The people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation 
whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon]. 
(Ta’if Accord 1989:1)
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In order to dismantle any ideas or notions of a permanent division of Lebanon into smaller 
autonomous territories/states, it is here noted that Lebanon is a unit that will not be divided. By 
using the term ‘Lebanese’ rather than using the various faction names, a state of unity is projected 
rather than a divided state.
The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central authority.
(Ta’if Accord 1989:4)
The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national fusion within the framework of 
preserving common coexistance and unity of the soil, people, and institutions.
(Ta’if Accord 1989:4)
These two sections of the accord suggest that Lebanon is ‘united’ and a ‘nation’. Its people live in 
‘common coexistence’ and ‘unity’. These four terms are typical key words (Fairclough 1992), 
which means that they are words used repeatedly throughout the accord in order to underline their 
significance. In this context, it can be argued that, the drafters of this accord needed to show that 
Lebanon is a nation, that it is united, etc.   
Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of secterian restriction, the parliamentary seats shall 
be divided according to the following bases:
a. Equally between Christians and Muslims.
b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect.
c. Proportionately between the districts.
(Ta’if Accord 1989:2)
This particular paragraph shows both the confessionalistic and Consociational roots of the accord. 
As described above, proportionality is a basic prerequisite for Consociational systems, and here it is 
stated that seats should be distributed according to this principle, more precisely according to sect, 
be that Maronite, Shia, etc. This paragraph requires that candidates declare their religious 
allegiance. Furthermore, proportionality is broken in order to guarantee balance in society, which is 
another hallmark of Consociationalism.
G. Abolition of Political Secterianism: Abolishing political secterianism is a fundamental national objective. To 
achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies elected 
on the basis of equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this objective 
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and to form a national council which is headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in addition to 
the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, and social notables. The council's 
task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the 
Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation of the phased plan. The following shall be 
done in the interim period:
a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in public jobs, the judiciary, 
the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in the independent agencies in accordance with the 
dictates of national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by 
Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.
b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card.
(Ta’if Accord 1989:4) 
This paragraph demonstrates that while Lebanon is a united nation, sects dominate the political 
system. While it is the object of the accord and any government following the accord to abolish this 
system, it is recognized that it is something that will require effort and planning. Rather it is a 
necessary evil, an important part of the political framework that is needed to maintain the newfound 
stability. 
With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not secterian, basis, a senate shall be formed 
and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. The senate powers shall be confined to crucial issues.
(Ta’if Accord 1989:2) 
This paragraph is interesting, as it claims that the senate should be elected on a national and not 
sectarian basis, but still issues that ‘all the spiritual families shall be represented’. While the 
expression ‘spiritual families’ differs from ‘sects’ in spelling it does not differ considerably in 
meaning. Therefore, it seems that since all spiritual families shall be represented, all sects are 
guaranteed representation within the senate. 
To summarize, when the accord was made, its drafters focused on themes like unity and Lebanon as 
a nation. Although Lebanon was not united and as a nation it was divided, the drafters of the accord 
still claim these values to project some form of hope and desire for a common future for Lebanon, 
in spite of a devastating civil war. This can be argued to mirror a belief that the image of unity and 
the nation can be constructed and the members of the nation produced and reproduced to feel 
belongingness to the nation, cf. chapter 2.3. The accord notes that the current system of assigning 
seats in parliament according to religious groupings should be dismantled, but this does not change 
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the fact that this is the way the system presently works and will continue to work unless the 
government takes steps to change it. Such steps have not yet been taken. This suggests that the 
current system is consociational. 
What is most interesting about the accord is that in its essence it is contradictory. There is no 
escaping the consociational heritage, and the confessional system still has an important place in 
Lebanese politics in spite of the fact that this system may have been an important contributing 
factor to the outbreak of the war. But at the same time as the accord guarantees that all factions 
should get a predetermined ‘piece of the pie’, thereby instituting confessionalism, the accord also 
seeks to break down these very factions, in order for Lebanon to become united again. However, 
this view presumes that the groups at one point in Lebanese history actually were united as 
Lebanese rather than Christians or Muslims. This is indeed the image the government is trying to 
project to both the Lebanese populace and the outside world. This is not in the least evident with the 
reconstruction of Beirut, as we shall discuss later, but also with the wording of the Ta’if Accord. As 
the nation’s history shows, it is somewhat doubtful that there ever was a Lebanese common national 
image that all groups identified with on an equal basis. Thus the Lebanese government is tasked not 
only with rebuilding the country, but also with constructing a common national narrative, which 
may help achieve unity. This is a notable challenge considering that the political system demands 
that group identities remain important.         
5.2 Power Sharing and Consociationalism
As Consociationalism is an important part of Lebanese politics, and since it acts as the institutional 
framework for the post-war reconstruction of Lebanon, it should be examined what power sharing 
and Consociationalism actually does, both in theory and in practice. While there are various ways to 
create and keep peace and stability in divided societies using power sharing, Lijphart’s 
Consociationalism is one of those methods most widely used. Consociationalism has been used in 
areas divided by conflict such as Northern Ireland, Cyprus and Lebanon before the war. Because of 
its wide usage, it has also been known to have failed in settling disputes in several cases. This has 
left Consociationalism open to extensive critique.
The key idea of any power sharing structure is that groups have to rule together by consensus, 
thereby making it impossible for one group to exclude the other (Schneckener 2002:203). This is 
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also the case for Consociationalism, which in addition focuses on elite-cooperation. This means that 
peace should be achieved by having the elites of the various factions cooperate in the political 
system, and this is accomplished best by incorporating mechanisms in the system which forces the 
factions to work together in large coalitions (Lijphart 1977:41). Such a mechanism would typically 
be some form of veto, which all factions to some degree would posses the right to use in order to 
guarantee that no law would be passed, which was not supported by all factions (Lijphart 
1977:36ff). In theory, this should practically eliminate the ability for extremists to gain any 
considerable influence, at least not without cooperating (Lijphart 1977:53). In Lebanon, the veto 
system is evident in the fact that the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament are 
interdependent in their decisions cf. chapter 4.2. It is thereby virtually impossible for one to make a 
major decision without consulting the others. The problem with this is that it can create political 
stalemate and thereby a weak state and this is not desirable in a divided country like Lebanon, 
where the creation of a strong state apparatus is vital for the unification of the people. 
The goal of power sharing is to end a conflict by making the factions cooperate rather than fight 
(El-Masri 2005:2). There are different views on how this should be done. Consociationalism is a 
confessionalistic approach, which means that candidates must before the election declare his or hers 
allegiance. In Lebanon’s case it is religious allegiance. The reason for this is that the number of 
seats for each faction in Parliament has been predetermined according to the faction’s size. This 
system is devised to guarantee that seats are distributed amongst factions according to proportional 
size. That all factions get their ‘fair share’ of the seats is an important principle of 
Consociationalism. (Lijphart 2004:100) In Lebanon, this number has been equally split between 
Christians and Muslims, so that each gets half of the seats. Additionally, the various factions within 
each faith are guaranteed a fixed number of seats according to their size. It should be noted, that 
while the Christians make up less than half of the Lebanese population they still get half of the 
seats, which in reality means that they are unproportionally over represented. This is quite common 
in consociationalistic systems, and while it breaks with the principle of complete proportionality, it 
is often deemed necessary to maintain balance, rather than allowing one faction to become so large 
that they control an absolute majority of the seats in Parliament. (Schneckener 2003:220f) As 
Lijphart himself has stated, there exist: “no consociational blueprint” (Lijphart 1982:175), and the 
principles of the method should be adapted to match the current situation in order to guarantee the 
peace (Schneckener 2003:218).      
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Consociationalism has received criticism on various points. The two most important points are the 
issues concerning confessionalism and elite cooperation, a criticism that also applies to the case of 
Lebanon. Regarding confessionalism it has been claimed that the fact that candidates must declare 
their ethnic allegiance in the long run only reinforces the divide. As factions and people define 
themselves by ethnicity or religion, it is difficult to break down the divide or create a national unity, 
which supersedes the old loyalties, and thus one of the causes for the conflict is never really 
extinguished. Consociationalists do not dispute this, but they do consider it a naïve solution 
considering the nature of the conflict. They point to the fact that factions only stop fighting if it is in 
their interest, and a system that does not reward them for their cooperation will most likely not be 
able to keep the peace and thus not be able to construct a national unity that can break down the old 
divide. (Sisk 2003:2f) 
This relates directly to the other point concerning elite cooperation. Where Lijphart’s approach is 
aimed at having the elites cooperating, it should be noted that nothing is really solved. Rather, a 
form of status quo is maintained where the elites take care of their own interests and rule together 
by necessity. Since this approach encourages the status quo amongst the elites, it makes it difficult 
for any changes within civil society, meaning in the average population, to take effect. This is what 
we can see in Lebanon today. The system is based on the elites, which are the factions who fought 
in the war, and the situation can be described as a kind of political stalemate, where the only thing 
appearing to hold the country together is the political construction. 
The Social Transformationists, who argue for an alternative form of power sharing, believe that the 
change should come from beneath, from society, in order for it to have any long-term effects. As a 
power sharing theory, Social Transformation is often viewed as being opposed to 
Consociationalism, and they are also opposed on some of the main points. Some of the Social 
Transformationists argue, that a complete break from former identities and the formation of a new 
common identity or national unity is preferable, in order to create peace and stability. Others speak 
of transforming part of the existing identities to encompass a national identity, which then would be 
the common focus. All agree that societies need to fundamentally change in order to rid themselves 
of the problems and disagreements that originally caused the conflicts, as opposed to the 
consociational approach of regulating the conflict. (El-Masri 2005:5ff)
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The Social Transformation approach designed by Horowitz called Integrative Power Sharing 
confronts these issues. The main goal of this type of power sharing is to minimize the risk of 
conflict by creating a common identity that supersedes the old ethnic or religious identities, for 
example a unifying national identity. The primary method of achieving this is to encourage 
cooperation between the groups and in that way bridge the gaps between them. (Horowitz 
2003:118, Sisk 2003:3) There are various ways to accomplish this, but an important tool is the 
electoral system, which should be designed to encourage moderate behaviour and cooperation 
(Horowitz 1985:628ff; Horowitz 2003:116). It should also be noted that while Lijphart’s 
Consociationalism focuses on elite cooperation, Integrative Power Sharing is more focused on 
making a change in the general population. 
Horowitz therefore makes the argument that a system, which is not based on confessionalistic 
power sharing would be better suited to solve a nation’s problems in the long run, simply because it 
then will be easier to break down the identities and create a common one instead. In Lebanon’s 
case, Horowitz would therefore probably argue, that the confessionalistic system should be 
abolished as soon as possible. As noted above, Consociationalists agree that this course of action 
probably would theoretically be ideal, however, it is regarded as unrealistic and naïve considering 
the hatred that usually follows the immediate end of a violent ethnic conflict. Instead, 
Consociationalists want to preserve the newfound stability by acknowledging the factions’ place in 
political life. In reality, they try to manage the conflict rather than actually solve it. (El-Masri 
2005:3) They claim, that a breakdown of identities would then occur over a long enough period of 
time given that political life gradually shifted its focus to other issues than in Lebanon’s case 
religion. In other words, only when religion plays a minor role can the change be made, and this is 
not a realistic goal at the immediate end of a war. The argument could then be that the fact that 
Consociationalism is so focused on elite-cooperation might make it less likely for this change to 
happen, since the elites have an active interest in maintaining the religious bounds, as these bounds 
are their raison d’etre. 
5.3 Conclusion
We will here give an answer to the sub-question: Does the accord and the political system facilitate 
or impede reconciliation and national unity in the Lebanese society? The political framework in 
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Lebanon was mainly created by the Ta’if Accord, and it is under this framework the government is 
working when trying to create reconciliation and national unity in Lebanon. While it is uncertain 
whether or not there is an actual common Lebanese pre-war national identity to recover, both the 
Ta’if Accord and the Social Transformationists stipulate that such a common identity should be 
constructed or reconstructed (Reinkowski 1997:510f). This can again be compared to Balibar and 
Anderson who also think identity and the image of the nation can be constructed. The object for the 
Lebanese government therefore seems to be to change the way the individual Lebanese of various 
factions imagine themselves and imagine the Lebanese nation (Reinkowski 1997:512). This does 
not just mean creating a national unity it also means dismantling the factional identities. In practice, 
the population’s loyalty should be shifted from the faction to the nation. The question is, if this is 
possible in the political system, which the accord has imposed.
The main problem with the accord is that it is contradictory. On the one hand, it signals that 
Lebanon is united and states that unity is a main goal for Lebanon by using the terms ‘unity’, 
‘nation’, ‘united’ and ‘common coexistence’ repeatedly in the accord. The accord is also called 
Charter of National Reconciliation, and as such was made with the purpose of achieving 
reconciliation and future national unity in Lebanon. It also stipulates that confessionalism should be 
abolished so that reconciliation and unity will be easier to accomplish, although this has yet to 
happen. 
On the other hand, the accord reinforces the divisions by using Consociationalism, because the 
political system forces the factions to keep declaring their religious allegiance. This has two results. 
Firstly, it makes it difficult for the sectarian identities to change and it will thereby be difficult to 
construct a national unity. Secondly, the formation of national unity will also be difficult, because 
the groups are forced to uphold their own sectarian identity in order to get seats in the Parliament. 
When they can only gain power by remaining divided it is not in their personal interest to create a 
united Lebanon, and even if it were in their interest, it would be difficult for the factions to agree on 
what the unity should be focused on. 
Conclusively, this Charter of National Reconciliation may allow for the creation of reconciliation 
by the: “…changing of destructive attitudes and behaviour into constructive relationships toward 
sustainable peace.”, as our definition states (Brounéus 2003:3). In the government, the elites do 
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communicate through constructive relationships, instead of killing each other and it can also be 
argued that this accord helped create sustainable peace. However, as is evident from the discussion 
above, it is less likely that the accord facilitates the creation of national unity in the country, 
although it states this as one of the main goals. In the following, we will among other things discuss 
how the government’s initiatives will work within this political framework. 
48
6 The Government’s Three Initiatives
In the pursuit for reconciliation and unity, the Lebanese government has instigated various 
initiatives. The first, the Law of General amnesty, was designed to guarantee that the process 
towards sustainable peace was not disrupted by the conflicts, which might follow trials. The second, 
the Ministry of Displaced, was given the task of relocating those Lebanese, who had been forced to 
flee their homes during the war, since it was deemed better for reconciliation if people live in mixed 
communities as they used to do. The third, the rebuilding of Beirut, is supposed to not only rebuild 
the nation’s capital but also create a symbol of national unity for both Lebanese and foreigners to 
admire. All initiatives have faced considerable challenges but have also had an impact on the 
reconciliation process, both positive and negative.  
6.1 Reconciliation through the Law of General Amnesty
The Law of General Amnesty
During the Lebanese civil war, more than 100.000 people died, and crimes include a long list of 
human-rights violations and brutal massacres (Knudsen 2005:1, 12). However, none of these crimes 
have been punished. On the 26 August 1991, the Lebanese Government issued a General Amnesty 
Law, which pardoned political crimes committed during the civil war (Amnesty International 
1997:4, Amnesty International 2004). This law secured a general amnesty for abuses committed by 
all the militias and armed groups during the civil war (Amnesty International 1997:6). The amnesty 
was given to the public in general, and the perpetrators were not required to confess their crimes in 
order to obtain amnesty. 
We will argue that this amnesty law was an initiative by the government, which had the purpose of
ending the conflict, creating stability and thereby setting a foundation for reconciliation. Supporting 
this argument, in 2005, Maronite MP Samir Franjieh defended the General Amnesty Law at a
conference organized by the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)30. He said that it 
should be seen as a means by which to end the war. He further stated: "…the priority then was to 
put an end to the conflict.". He added that the law was also the result of fear of the return to 
violence and destabilisation. (Rafei 2005) 
                                                
30 ICTJ is an organization which assists: "…countries pursuing accountability for past mass atrocity or human rights 
abuse." (Rafei 2005)
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Others, however, point to the fact that the law in question was made by the same people who 
committed the crimes during the war (Haugbølle 2002). It is no secret that the politicians who now 
have seats in government were leaders of militia groups during the civil war. Their participation in 
government today would not have been possible was it not for this law granting them amnesty for 
their crimes. (Knudsen 2005:12) As Sune Haugbølle31 puts it: “Those responsible for the war (…) 
became responsible for rebuilding the country. Naturally, these people have had no great desire to 
shed further light on the past.” (Haugbølle 2005:192). Seen through this light, the statement from 
Franjieh above loses some of its credibility, as his family was actively involved in the civil war and 
had their own militia (Wikipedia Webpage 9). It is possible that this family have had personal gains 
from the General Amnesty Law. 
Another argument for the amnesty, posted by the government, was that everybody was equally 
guilty since all groups had been involved in the fighting. Therefore, all should forgive and move on. 
(Haugbølle 2002) Besides this, putting such a large proportion of society on trial would have 
brought the country to a virtual standstill, as there were not enough resources to carry this burden 
(Haugbølle 2005:193).
A political argument for the Law of General Amnesty is that there was no clear winner of the 
Lebanese war. The slogan: “… la ghalib la maghlub,” or “no victor, no vanquished” (Haugbølle 
2005:193, Reinkowski 1997:501) has been used to describe the situation. As there is no winner, no 
single group can demand justice from the other. (Graybill 2004:1124, Tutu:2)
Thereby, the motives behind the issuing of this law are multiple. First of all, it was an initiative 
made to create the stability needed for future reconciliation, although the fact that the perpetrators 
actually gave themselves amnesty is a bit suspicious. Second, it was practical, as trials would 
require too many resources. Third, there was no winner in the war and therefore no one to demand 
justice. If we assume that it really was an initiative to create future reconciliation, how has the law 
actually affected the reconciliation process? This we will discuss later on. 
                                                
31 Haugbølle is a Master student at Oxford University. His area of expertise is the study of collective memory of the 
Lebanese war. (Haugbølle 2002)
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The Importance of Justice when Reconciling
In order to discuss the process of reconciliation in Lebanon, we have examined how this process has 
emerged, or failed to, in three other countries: South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda. Based on 
the research from these countries, there are emerging three different methods to deal with war 
crimes after a civil war. These can be broadly categorised as truth, punishment and silence. 
(Graybill 2004:1117)
The first way of dealing with the trial of criminals after civil war is through Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions, as in South Africa (Tutu:1, Cairns et al 2003:146). The process 
proceeds as follows: the truth about the crime is revealed, the perpetrator is faced with the victim, 
the perpetrator receives full amnesty and reparation is paid to the victim (Graybill 2004:1117ff). 
These procedures are based on a belief that the acknowledgement of the crime and the revelation of 
the truth will lead to forgiveness and thereby reconciliation. It is called restorative justice, meaning 
that it focuses on crime as something that affects the whole of society. The interest is here to end the 
cycle of violence by official acknowledgement, apologies and compensation. (Brounéus 2003:29) 
These Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have also been used in Chile (Bamber 1994). 
However, in Lebanon the fragmentation in the government, which the Ta’if Accord upholds, would 
make it very difficult to set up Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. The commission would have 
to be made up of representatives from all the different communities in order for it to hold 
credibility. Furthermore, such a commission would inevitably require interviewing members of 
Parliament and the government. Because of the post civil war system and the fact that many 
members of the government are former warlords, who have committed acts during the war which 
may seriously offend other groups, or perhaps even offend members of the government of another 
creed it is highly unlikely that these would even want to participate. Therefore, such a truth 
commission would probably face considerable challenges in actually arriving at the truth, since it 
could not count on those most likely to know the truth to participate due to political considerations. 
Also, because of Lebanon’s deep religious and societal cleavages, one can question whether this 
method will succeed when there is no punishment of the perpetrators. Lingering feelings of 
vengeance, which are not met and acknowledged by the Commissions, can perhaps cause people to 
take the law into their own hands. One can therefore question if such a process could create 
reconciliation, yet alone national unity. Instead, one can fear that the process would create further 
conflict.
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This leads us to the second method of dealing with war crimes, which is through punishment as was 
done in Rwanda after the genocide. This is a process of trying the perpetrators for their crimes and 
giving them their due punishment. Some argue that this is: “The pursuit for justice without 
reconciliation.” (Graybill 2004:1121), as the focus is not on forgiveness or the revelation of truth. It 
is a form of retributive justice, where focus is on crime as a matter between the perpetrator and the 
state. Punishment and compensation to the victim is decided by the justice system. The problem 
with this is that it silences the truth, because the perpetrators might withhold information to avoid 
punishment. (Brounéus 2003:29) This kind of punishing method can best be used in countries 
where there has been a clear winner of the war, like was the case in Rwanda (Graybill 2004:1124). 
In Lebanon, however, there was no clear winner of the war, and therefore this punishment method 
could cause problems. It would be necessary to make sure there was exactly the same amount of 
people tried and punished from each group, otherwise the proceedings could cause anger and 
renewed conflict. But that would be a great challenge to administer. 
The third method used to deal with war crimes is to ignore that they took place at all and introduce a 
state sanctioned amnesia. This was the method used in Mozambique. This process involves the 
issuing of a General Amnesty Law, the absence of trials, investigations or acknowledging of the 
crimes committed during the war. However, in the case of Mozambique, the acknowledgement of 
crimes by the state was replaced by traditional rituals of reintegration and forgiveness performed in 
the local villages. (Graybill 2004:1125ff) 
All the three methods above have met criticism. The Truth and Reconciliation Committees are 
criticized by some for not giving justice to the victims and for possibly causing trauma for the 
victims as they are pushed to forgive at a pace which is not their own (Cairns et al 2003:165). The 
punishment method is criticized for not bringing about reconciliation. The last method of state 
sanctioned amnesia is the one, which is most similar to the way the government in Lebanon has 
handled the post-war situation. As mentioned above, there were many different reasons why the 
Lebanese government chose to issue a General Amnesty Law, e.g. a wish for stability and future 
reconciliation, lack of resources to try all the criminals etc. By giving a general amnesty to all 
criminals, without forcing them to tell about their crimes, the government in Lebanon has given up 
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the benefits, which the two other methods are said to bring. In fact, although one of the purposes 
behind the law was to further future reconciliation, it might be doing the opposite. 
With this law, there will be no punishment, which some believe is necessary as a deterrent against 
future repetition. An example from Chile shows that denying the victims justice through the 
punishment of their wrongdoers can lead to anger: “In 1992 citizens launched a campaign to annul 
the 1978 amnesty law, with victims and their supporters staging protests that led to angry clashes 
with the police.”. (Bamber 1994) So in that case, amnesty actually led to conflict instead of 
preventing it. This can also be traced in current Lebanon where both the political and societal 
tension can be seen in the post-war violence (Knudsen 2005:10f). 
Furthermore, with a general amnesty, the truth about the crimes will not be revealed and thereby 
acknowledged, so the victims can move on. As Haugbølle points out, both Sigmund Freud and 
Desmond Tutu claim it is important to deal with the past, otherwise it can pose a problem later on in 
life (Haugbølle 2002, Tutu:2). Also Professor Biggar argues that deliberately forgetting the past is 
not recommended. His argument is that the victims will never forget and it is the state’s 
responsibility to defend and protect its citizens, which in Lebanon would be difficult, due to the 
zuama network. Biggar further states, that: “…unaddressed grievances will infect future relations 
between people as well as create deep mistrust of the state.” (Brounéus 2003:12, Biggar 2001:7) 
The revelation of truth by the perpetrators, led by the government, is also important as it helps 
establish an official memory of the war: 
This is about more than just remembering - it is about keeping those memories, those true memories, alive to 
allow a new society to be built, a democratic and just society where wrongs done in the past are recognised and 
the principle of prevention is continuously upheld. (Bamber 1994)
This might be right in theory, but in Lebanon one of the problems is the inability of the government 
to agree on an official story of the war. As is evident from the Ta’if Accord cf. chapter 5.1, the 
government aims at creating national unity in Lebanon, and to open for official talks about the 
events of the war might not be the best way to obtain unity. However, burying the truth might create 
problems for the government in the future, if we are to believe Haugbølle. Another problem is that 
the government consists of so many factions, who are the same, which fought during the war. To 
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acknowledge what happened during the war would be the same as admitting their guilt. Again it 
becomes a problem that there was no actual winner of the war. The war was stopped by the Arab 
League with the Ta’if Accord, and there is therefore no victor who can impose their justice on the 
rest of the country, like there was in Rwanda (Graybill 2004:1124). There being one single victor 
does not, however, automatically imply that viable peace and stability will prevail. 
To recall this project’s definition of reconciliation: “Reconciliation is a societal process [which can 
be furthered by the government] that involves mutual acknowledgement of past suffering and the 
changing of destructive attitudes and behaviour into constructive relationships toward sustainable 
peace.” (Brounéus 2003:3 [Our additions]), this has a focus on the acknowledgement of past 
suffering, in order to achieve peace. The families of the victims in Lebanon are denied this 
acknowledgement and instead see the perpetrators daily on television posing as the leaders of their 
country. How does this affect the reconciliation process? Has the General Amnesty Law created a 
foundation for reconciliation or has it caused mistrust towards the government because they have 
denied the people acknowledgement and justice? Professor Irani sees the lack of acknowledgement 
from the government as an obstacle to reconciliation in Lebanon, as stated in chapter 2.2. He 
believes that acknowledgement is necessary to reach reconciliation because acknowledgement 
makes room for forgiveness and after that reconciliation. We disagree with Irani that forgiveness is 
essential for obtaining reconciliation, we, however, agree that acknowledgement is essential in 
achieving reconciliation. This we argue since we believe it is almost impossible to solve a problem 
and develop viable peace and reconciliation without acknowledging what has caused the dispute in 
the first place. However, this argument could merely be due to our Westernised way of solving 
problems. As the Mozambican the Lebanese might have their own way of dealing with their 
problems. As Kamal Salibi32 states: “Thankfully we are a very forgetful culture.” (Haugbølle 
2005:196). 
Might trials of war criminals lead to renewed conflict? According to Haugbølle, most Lebanese 
people see the dilemma in Lebanon as this: “Forgetting the war might make it repeat itself at some 
point, but remembering it will most likely make it happen again right away. What good will it do to 
look the beast in the eye if it is going to bite your head off?” (Haugbølle 2002). Perhaps the 
Lebanese people are better off forgetting? Bringing up the past and confronting people with the 
                                                
32 Kamal Salabi is a Professor of the American University in Beirut. (Webpage 18)
54
atrocities, which took place might bring forth the currently dormant feelings of hatred. As 
mentioned before, Lebanon is now in a state of political stalemate. One of the only things holding 
the country together is the political system, which is based on the consocialistic sharing of power. 
With the Law of General Amnesty, the government in Lebanon has chosen to focus on the future 
and leave the past behind. Maybe they did this to avoid punishment themselves, or maybe they did 
it because stability was important for future reconciliation, or maybe both. Either way, this was a 
decision made by the government. But what about the rest of society, are they ready for 
reconciliation?
Is the Civil Society Ready for Reconciliation?
Consequently, one of the main questions in this discussion must be: Are the Lebanese ready to 
forgive and to reconcile? Do they want trials and justice or is this, as discussed earlier, maybe just a 
Westernised view on how war crimes should be dealt with? Maybe the belief that unresolved and 
silenced problems and traumas will come back to haunt us is a Western discourse. Perhaps in 
societies like the Lebanese there are traditional coping methods in civil societies, which do not 
require action from the government. This was the case in Mozambique, as described above. We 
have, however, not found any indications of these traditional coping methods in Lebanon.
Azar and Mullet have carried out two studies of the propensity to forgive in the six larger religious 
groups: Catholic, Druze, Maronite, Orthodox, Shia and Sunni, cf. chapter 3.2. Their results showed 
that all groups had an overall high propensity to forgive and that they were equally willing to 
forgive perpetrators from their own group as perpetrators from other religious groups. However, the 
factor of apology was very important for all groups. (Azar et al. 2002:737) From these results we 
can see that the communities in Lebanon are ready for reconciliation and forgiveness, but that 
apology is necessary. With the General Amnesty Law, the government is not able to do anything 
about this through trials or Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, like in South Africa and Chile. 
The government issued the Law of General Amnesty in the belief that it would help create the 
necessary stability, which is needed for future reconciliation. However, this law prevents any 
official acknowledgements, which we see as essential to the achievement of reconciliation. 
Furthermore, the amnesty silences any official talk of the past and the war and thereby puts a stop to 
any apologies, which the Lebanese themselves view as important if they are to forgive and move 
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on, according to Azar and Mullet. Effectively, the law means that the government cannot do any 
more to legally promote reconciliation through justice, so perhaps it is now the job of the civil 
society to create reconciliation and not the government, that it should come from below and not 
above. 
An attempt at reconciliation was made by former Lebanese Forces official Assa’ad Shaftari, who 
issued a public apology to all his victims in a newspaper, in 2000. Shaftari said he did it in the name 
of reconciliation, but was met with accusations of betrayal from the Christian community after 
publishing his memoirs. As Haugbølle puts it, this: “…was a radical breach with the self-imposed 
silence regarding own misdeeds, not only of former Christian leaders, but of all former high-
ranking militiamen in Lebanon.”. This apology did not create incentives for others, only 
condemnation. (Haugbølle 2002)
Azar and Mullet’s study shows the willingness to forgive in all the religious groups. This above 
example mirrors a wish to start the reconciliation, but it has not spread to all parts of the society. An 
obstacle has been the unwritten agreement of silence about what happened during the war. But 
perhaps this is changing so that the civil society can become the engine for reconciliation in 
Lebanon. The role of the civil society and the population will be discussed further in chapter 6.2 
and 6.3.
Conclusion
Our conclusion to this chapter will be the answer to the second sub-question: How has the Law of 
General Amnesty influenced the process of reconciliation and unity, and are the groups ready for 
reconciliation? The law was made to create stability and with a hope that it could lay the foundation 
for reconciliation. The General Amnesty Law was understandable at the time when it was issued. It 
would have been impossible to put so many people on trial, and it would leave the Parliament 
practically empty, with nobody to lead the country. Not to mention that the fragile peace might not 
be able to handle the pressure of such proceedings. Besides this, the structure of the Lebanese 
government and politics would make any legal trials or Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
difficult to implement, since many of the people targeted during any such process would be 
politicians, due to their role in the conflict. One could imagine that there would be disagreements 
about who should be tried and focus on how many people were tried from each group. If for 
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instance the amount of Christians on trial surpassed the amount of Muslims this could cause anger 
and conflict. We therefore understand why the law was made and why it would have been difficult 
to use any other method.
Having said this, the amnesty law brings with it some negative influence on the process of 
reconciliation in Lebanon. As we define it in chapter 2.2, acknowledgement of past crimes is a 
precondition for reconciliation, but the Law of General Amnesty poses as an obstacle to this 
acknowledgement. As Azar and Mullet’s study shows, the groups in Lebanon are ready to forgive, 
but they need apologies. The amnesty law and the unwritten code of silence prevent the government 
from giving these. So perhaps the acknowledgement of crimes and even apologies should be dealt 
with in a different forum. Maybe we should not see it as the responsibility of the government but 
rather as the task of local communities in the civil society, like in Mozambique. Perhaps 
reconciliation in Lebanon is bound to come from below, and not above.
6.2 Achieving Reconciliation via the Ministry of Displaced
The Lebanese government’s plan for reconciliation and unity is in large part concentrated around 
the principle of returning to the Lebanese Golden Age from before the war where Lebanon in many 
ways was still united. A distinct feature of the Lebanese society back then was that the many 
minorities lived in relatively mixed communities. As such, it seems a logical step to recreate this 
situation so that the people can be united once more and the country can return to former glory. 
The Creation of the Ministry 
Due to the 15 year long civil war, which was bloody with brutalities and massacres, Lebanon was 
left extremely religiously parted. (Knudsen 2005:1, Nagel 2002) To prevent another civil war from 
breaking out, and in the light of the Ta’if Accord, which states: “ … every Lebanese evicted since 
1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established. Legislation to guarantee 
this right and to insure the means of reconstruction shall be issued …” (Ta’if Accord 1989:5), the 
government has in the following post-war years made a programme with the purpose of moving the 
many displaced people back to their original homes. (Salem 1994, Høxbroe 1999:1)
As noted earlier, over 500.000 Lebanese were displaced or became refugees, and it changed the 
geographical distribution of the population. Mount Lebanon was affected the most, an area that 
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before the war housed a multi-confessional populace. (UNDP Webpage 1) The displaced have 
become poor people, due to loss of houses, jobs, and family, which helped to provide for them. In 
fact: “… over 50% of the Displaced are not able to meet their basic needs and 12,5 % live in 
absolute poverty.” (UNDP Webpage 1).
Therefore, Lebanon established The Ministry of Displaced in 1992, with the purpose of managing a 
return programme that should help the returnees to get back on their feet. The resettlement of the 
displaced was also initiated in order to sustain peace within the country, and to prevent the 
displaced from posing a threat to the unity of the new Lebanon (Høxbroe 1999:64), a unity which 
was highly valued by the Ta’if Accord, as discussed in chapter 5.1. However, because of the civil 
war’s comprehensive effect on the country’s finances, the Ministry of Displaced did not take on this 
task by themselves. They developed the programme in coordination with institutions, such as 
donors, NGOs, UN agencies, like UNDP, and other ministries within the Lebanese government that 
had to do with the reconstruction of the Mount Lebanon region. (UNDP Webpage 1)
The Ministry of Displaced, in cooperation with its donors, has started multiple initiatives to help the 
displaced people resettle in their former locations. First of all, the Ministry has provided the 
returnees with economical and practical help like subsidies to rebuild their homes. The activities in 
this part of the programme were as follow:
Removal of rubble and rehabilitation of the infrastructure in the villages of  return and
Evacuation of occupied houses and their return to lawful owners, 
Assisting returnees to repair and rebuild their houses, (UNDP Webpage 2)
Other than that, they have also focused on rehabilitation concerning the creation of jobs, given 
support to the agricultural process, made sure that the returnees could acquire health care etc. 
(UNDP Webpage 1) This rehabilitation programme was assessed necessary in order to obtain future 
reconciliation between the residents and the displaced. This practical and economical side of the 
programme is where most of the money has been spent. There has been very little focus on the 
emotional side of reconciliation. (Høxbroe 1999:85f) 
However, a concern of many Lebanese professionals involved in this programme is the younger 
generation and the possibility of them growing up and inheriting their parents’ hostility towards the 
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religious affiliations different from themselves. (Høxbroe 1999:83) This is why the Ministry of 
Displaced, together with UNPD, has initiated and held some special youth camps, which functioned 
as a kind of reconciliation workshop. 
The motivation was that the young people have expressed interest in meeting other young people 
from the other groups but did not know how. These projects target the more emotional level and are 
created so that the local people and communities achieve reconciliation. The youth camps have only 
been arranged in a few areas and only for Druzes and Christians. The plan is to form more camps 
and common activities for the various factions, but this has not been initiated yet. These youth 
camps can be argued to be a helpful start to make people acquainted with each other and interact 
over common issues. (UNDP Webpage 1) 
In the programme the: “…overarching strategy was a focus on reintegration and conflict resolution 
through youth mobilization in villages.” (UNDP Webpage 1). Thus, the programme was focused on 
the following sectors:
a) Reconciliation: among returnees and local population, youth and children through community participation in 
programme implementation, training/workshops in civic education and conflict resolution; sports and cultural 
activities.
b) Social Development: equipment and supplies for the existing dispensaries, training for health personnel; basic 
equipment to primary schools, training for teachers; basic services and income-generating activities for vulnerable 
groups;
c) Economic Development: agricultural and livestock production, small-scale family businesses, credit and 
marketing systems, employment and income generation;
d) The project also ensures that Environment and Gender are maintained as cross cutting issues within the 
activities and the impact.
(UNDP Webpage 1).
Regarding the reconciliation process for the returnees and residents, the youth programme has 
mostly focused on education of the youth in the region, providing skill training, confidence building
etc. (UNDP Webpage 1). It has also been supporting the process by providing training for the local 
communities and especially the staff that interact with the young generation. The training should 
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make the people in question able to acquire skills to handle conflict resolutions by peaceful means, 
skills that can promote reconciliation and peace building attitudes etc. (UNDP Webpage 1) 
Challenges and Effects of the Ministry’s Programmes
With these programmes set in motion, which primarily aim at the Mount Lebanon region, there still 
remain tensions between Muslims and Christians, which cause the continuing sectarianism. Political 
assassinations, sectarian violence on civilians, vendettas between rival Islamist groups are gradually 
rising in post-war Lebanon. This violence has been named ‘the return of the bomb’ and means that 
the various religious groups keep score on each other’s attacks. The rising violence is according to 
Knudsen, due to the unresolved security problem. Additionally, Syria, according to the UN, also 
plays a part, still trying to gain political influence in Lebanon. (Knudsen 2005:10) So still, 15 years 
after the war ended, the hostility between the different groups is visible. This also suggests that the 
government lacks full control of its territory, and the various parts of government have not been 
able to cooperate well. Besides this, investigations of attacks and assassinations are lacking. 
(Knudsen 2005:10) 
The sectarianism, the increasing violence and the lack of political cooperation can be explained by 
the consociationalistic power sharing system posed in the Ta’if Accord. The members of 
government still have to confess their religious belongingness, which as stated above keeps the 
parties segregated. This system can thus be perceived as contradictive. How is it possible for the 
government to force the various religious groups to interact and live as mixed communities without 
paying attention to their religious kinship, if the government due to its political structure cannot 
cooperate without confessionalism itself? If the government is to project itself as a role model for 
society, they too need to abolish the confessionalistic system. 
With the current instability, one can get an idea of how the resettlement process and let alone how 
the reconciliation process is proceeding. One can also question the Ministry of Displaced’s efforts. 
With the increasing political and civic violence that occurs in Lebanon, how can the Ministry 
provide credibility to convince the returnees that it is safe for them to move back? 
The Ministry of Displaced have faced multiple challenges in the administrative execution of the 
resettlement programmes. First of all, there has been a lack of coordination between the different 
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parts of the programme, which resulted in there being evacuated twice as many families as there 
was being rebuild house for in 1995, which of course was very unfortunate for the evacuees. 
(UNDP Webpage 2) Another problem has been corruption in the Ministry. For instance, while 
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was in charge of the Ministry of Displaced, a disproportionate amount 
of money was used to aid the Druze community, instead of benefiting the Christians, who account 
for 75% of the displaced. (Knudsen 2005:17)
Overall, the programmes have not been easy for the government to execute (Høxbroe 1999:80). As 
mentioned above, there is currently still hostility, not only towards different communities, but also 
within the same. In addition to this, the warlords who were responsible for the great displacement 
are due to the broad General Amnesty Law in charge of the programme and the government, as 
described in chapter 6.1. This can therefore cause distrust and suspicion among the people who are 
to move, towards the people who command them to and hence prolong the process. 
Besides the financial and credibility issues, the people need to feel safe before they move back 
regarding the different religious groups they are suppose to live next to. To reach a resettlement 
between the factions, the Ministry of Displaced has developed a system, where the local leaders of 
the different religious groups are used as mediators: the Imam of the Sunni Muslims, the Sheikh 
Al Sohl of the Druzes and the Patriarch of the Orthodox Christians etc. Thus, they meet and 
discuss their difficulties and disputes and achieve a resettlement solution. However, what can 
cause these meetings to fail is that only the leaders attend the reconciliation meetings, not the local 
people, whom the resettlement affects the most. It can therefore be problematic to solve the 
disagreements and conflicts between the groups in question, due to their lack of participation even 
though their respective leaders inform them about what has been discussed. (Høxbroe 1999:81) 
As stated before, the people that are to move back can have difficulties in trusting the government. 
So in that respect, the Ministry of Displaced are forced to use the network of the zuama to 
implement the programme. This is the broad patronage/clientelism relationship that rules in 
Lebanon as discussed in chapter 4.2. Thus on the one hand, in the process of resettling the displaced 
people, the government has to include the religious leaders as mediators to make contact. On the 
other hand, using the religious leaders as mediators and not governmental officials can be an 
obstacle for the government itself, concerning the distrust this generates towards the government. 
61
Using this form of patronage/clientelism mediation can increase the separation of the groups and 
hence make it difficult to enhance central authority and to combat corruption. This is yet another 
example of the lack of a dominating state apparatus, as Balibar calls it. 
In the areas where people have been exposed to extreme violent brutalities and massacres, the 
mediation between the local leaders can be much more difficult. The Ministry of Displaced has 
listed the different displacement groups after how much violence and damage their respective 
communities have gone through. The people who have gone through very difficult war crimes are 
not expected to move back until a reasonable solution is made for the two groups. Reconciliation 
meetings are only arranged for the groups where the exposure to gruesome violence has been 
severe. Groups, which have experienced a lesser degree of violence are not offered reconciliation 
meetings but are just moved, and are therefore still hostile towards each other. (Høxbroe 1999:82f)
A reason for the government only to arrange meetings where the conflicts have been most bloody 
can be found in the country’s economy. Lebanon was left with post-war poverty and currently there 
is high unemployment and as mentioned earlier 12, 5% of the population is living below the poverty 
line (Knudsen 2005:3). Hence, for the government to arrange reconciliation meetings in villages 
besides the most traumatised ones can be a problem due to the lack of finances. In addition to 
Lebanon’s economical crises, the state does not offer any public social safety net, health care, or 
anything within this category. These services are performed by the private sectors, thus the poor 
people are dependent on their local networks of family, friends or sectarian charities33 (Knudsen 
2005:3). This is also considered a factor, which can prevent the people from moving back to their 
old homes, since they have developed new relations where they currently live. They cannot be 
certain that the former area will meet the same level of service, which is met in their present 
neighbourhood, especially if they are to move back next to a different religious sect. In this context, 
the post-war poverty makes it extremely challenging for the government to obtain a sufficient 
national service sector. This leads to strong patronage/clientelistic relationships, which leads to 
hesitation for the people who are to resettle due to uncertainty whether or not they can survive in the 
former area. This also slows the resettlement process. 
                                                
33 See also our chapters about corruption and poverty in Lebanon chapter 4.2.
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Another aspect and critique of the resettlement programme of the displaced is that the government 
focuses mostly on the practical solution rather than the emotional, which makes it complicated to 
achieve reconciliation. As Irani might be right, there is another reason, besides the poverty obstacles 
as mentioned before, for the government not to focus on the emotional level. According to the Ta’if 
Accord, it is the government’s aim to gain national unity, cf. chapter 5.1. The government is not 
interested in focusing on and discussing the differences between the respective communities. 
Instead the government would like to focus on collective issues and goals to achieve stability and 
thereby not risk problematic confrontations that could develop into greater hostility and thus 
possible violence. (Høxbroe 1999:83) It seems that the government would much rather focus on 
issues, which create national unity, instead of revelling on the past. In spite of this, the Ministry has 
cooperated with the UN, NGOs and other ministries to articulate activities that can help create 
reconciliation and dialogue on the community level, like the workshops mentioned above. 
However, these have still only been executed in very few areas. 
By not focussing more on the sensitive issues, the core reason for hesitation to resettle is not solved. 
The government’s Law of General Amnesty can be interpreted to say that there are neither 
perpetrators nor victims, and this can create a frustrating feeling among the people who feel like 
victims. Irani states: “If you do not help people to get out of their complex of victimisation, they will 
always resort to use violence in order to achieve their aims.” (Høxbroe 1999:83). This leaves the 
government in a complex situation, which can cause violence regardless of their neglect of 
discussing sensitive issues or vice versa. Due to this suppression of the emotional issues and 
feelings, Rita Ayoub34 states: “…everybody expects a new war every 30-40-60 years.” (Høxbroe 
1999:83). 
On a positive note, in the areas where there have been youth camps, the preliminary effects have 
generally been encouraging. The workshops resulted in greater knowledge, even though the 
attendants remained precarious towards each other, still keeping in mind that their parents have 
been in combat and killed each other. (Høxbroe 1999:84) The youth programme was externally 
evaluated in late 2001 and the evaluation mission concluded that the activities were vital for 
obtaining reconciliation, and recommended that the budget for the programme should be increased. 
The evaluation mission stated:
                                                
34 From an interview by Høxbroe with Rita Ayoub, who worked for the Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies in 1997. 
Ayoub is a former employee at the Ministry of Displaced. (Høxbroe 1999:126)
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As the programme proves to be an efficient tool in supporting the reconciliation and socio-economic 
interventions of the Ministry of Displaced, there is a necessity for extending the Programme activities over this 
later lifetime (UNDP Webpage 1).
If these recommendations are met and more networks are created, this could help put more focus on 
the emotional level and address the issues of victimisation, which the General Amnesty Law have 
neglected. However, only time will tell whether or not the government’s fear of the return of 
violence is well founded. 
Can Mixed Communities Create Reconciliation?
Lijphart agues: ”High fences make good neighbours.” (Wilson 2002:11). With the post-war 
violence and the religious tension that are present in Lebanon, one can propose that letting the 
groups remain separated in independent religious regions would be a good idea. The reason for 
Lijphart’s argument for separation of the religious/ethnic groups is that even though the separation 
would cause further tension, it would also mean that the different affiliations would not be in 
violent confrontation. In the long run, Lijphart suggests that the separation will lead to viable peace 
as can be seen in Switzerland and Belgium. Lijphart has, however, never spoken for the actual 
movement of people. His theory is aimed at countries where the groups are already living separated. 
His point is that there are considerable advantages to separation. What Lijphart suggests is a federal 
solution, where each group gets their own territory and a certain degree of autonomy, although still 
held together by a central state. (Lijphart 1977:87ff) In Lebanon’s case, Lijphart would probably 
argue, that letting the groups remain separated would be the best way to avoid further conflict in the 
future. 
Other scholars disagree with Lijphart concerning the separation of the different religious groups. 
Horowitz35 has an opposite view, which entails that different ethnic or religious groups should live 
together in one diverse heterogenic federal state. He believes that heterogenic states are the optimal 
choice, and that it has a reducing effect on the conflicts. He deems that the groups thereby will be 
forced to cooperate and reach collective solutions on the local level. This would improve dialogue 
                                                
35 Horowitz is also not an advocate of moving people but talks about states where people already live mixed. He further 
states that this solution will be best in states where the differences between the groups’ sizes are relatively small. 
(Horowitz 1985:617)
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and communication between the groups, and might in time lead to reconciliation, integration and 
future unity. (Horowitz 1985:617ff, Sisk 2003:3) 
So what is the best solution in Lebanon’s case, separation or mixed communities? The Lebanese 
government is trying to move the people back and create mixed communities and thereby chooses 
the second solution. The hope is, that this might further communication between the groups and 
perhaps reconciliation in the future. But the question remaining is this: are the people ready to move 
back; are there a wish and a will in society to make this happen? 
Is the Population Ready to Move Back and Reconcile?
Before the Lebanese war, the religious groups in Lebanon lived side by side in mixed communities, 
so perhaps it is not that distant a wish to see it happen again. However, between then and now many 
events have taken place during the civil war, which have deepened the divisions in society. As 
mentioned in chapter 6.1, studies show that the people in Lebanon are ready to forgive, if they are 
presented with an apology, but that is not the same as being willing to live next to each other. 
It is mostly the older generation who is willing to move back to where they lived before the war, as 
they still have some emotional attachment to the area. Younger people do not feel that they belong 
to these places and usually prefer to stay where they live today. (Høxbroe 1999:88f) Nevertheless, 
there have been some beginning examples of reconciliation efforts at community level in Lebanon. 
In 2001, Maronite and Druze leaders met and announced that the two communities had reconciled. 
However, shortly after this official announcement, there was a big crackdown on anti-Syrian 
parties: “The actions of the Lebanese authorities were widely interpreted as a Syrian engineered 
coup d’etat against national reconciliation.”. (Knudsen 2005:16) Hence, the Syrian presence and 
power in Lebanon has at times posed as an obstacle to reconciliation, as Syria had an interest in 
upholding instability, in order to maintain their role as the peacekeeping occupier (Knudsen
2005:11). The fact remains, however, that there was an attempt at reconciliation, which was 
initiated by the groups in society themselves and not by the government. This suggests the presence 
of a will in society for reconciliation, at least in the Druze and Maronite communities. Similar 
initiatives have not been observed elsewhere in the Lebanese society. Perhaps the fact that this 
official announcement of reconciliation took place in the Druze and Maronite communities is the 
result of the youth camps carried out by the Ministry of Displaced in this area. If this is the case, the 
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announcement should be seen as an indication that the youth camps are having the intended effect, 
and also as a sign that the reconciliation initiatives have the backing of the society in this area. 
Another example of a society-driven reconciliation initiative is described by El-Masri, based on a 
2003 study, where he interviewed 10 leaders of CSOs in various fields in Lebanon (El-Masri 
2005:12ff). Since the end of the war, the number of CSOs in Lebanon has increased from 4000 –
15.000. The purpose of his study was to examine which role the CSOs play in the reconciliation 
process. El-Masri’s study showed that numerous CSOs have joined forces in many different parts of 
Lebanon to:
…encourage national dialogue and inter-ethnic reconciliation. They are doing this by 
sponsoring common trips for Christian and Muslims students, common dinners for 
teachers from all sects, and by encouraging students of different schools to interact, 
among other activities. (El-Masri 2005:15)
This example shows that there is a will in the society to obtain reconciliation, and that it is not just a 
top-down political initiative. In the future, if the CSOs and the rest of civil society in Lebanon 
become stronger, these might be able to create a reconciliation process from below to complement 
the government’s programmes from above.
Conclusion
There is a certain controversy in the fact that on the one hand, the government is trying to get the 
people to live next to each other, and on the other hand the government has still not taken any steps 
to change the confessionalism in the political system, which reinforces the divisions between the 
groups. Here we will answer the third sub-question: What has the Ministry of Displaced done to 
promote reconciliation, how is this initiative being received by society and what has the society 
done itself? The Ministry of Displaced has initiated many programmes in collaboration with their 
donors. The funding has mostly been used on the practical issues like evacuation of houses and 
economical help for the families to rebuild their homes. The Ministry has met critique for not 
focussing enough on other aspects of reconciliation other than the actual moving of people and the 
creation of mixed communities. It could seem, that they have worked from the assumption that 
everything could just go back to how it was before the war, without anybody having to talk about it 
or bring up old memories. This is concordant with other of the government’s initiatives, which also 
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try to forget the past and focus on the future instead and have the future create a form of unity. The 
Law of General Amnesty had this purpose and as we will discuss in the next chapter, the rebuilding 
of Beirut also mirrors a will in the government to forget the past atrocities and move on towards a 
united future. However, as mentioned earlier, another very important reason for the Ministry mostly 
to include the practical level, instead of the emotional, was also fear of the instability it might create 
if they started a dialogue between the different communities. But not to acknowledge the emotional 
problems can have a negative effect in the long run.
The government did, however, have some initiatives, which addressed reconciliation through 
dialogue, e.g. the youth camps. The evaluation of these camps showed positive effects and they 
have also been received well by the local communities. This was especially evident from the official 
announcement of reconciliation made by the Druze and Maronites in 2001. Nevertheless, to our 
knowledge, the youth camps are still only found in the area around Mount Lebanon and have not 
yet spread to other parts of the country. UNDP recommends that this initiative be given more 
funding.
The civil society also shows indications that they are ready for and willing to attempt reconciliation. 
Aside from the Druze and Maronite announcement, there have also been initiatives made by CSOs 
working together to cross the religious divide. This can be seen as reconciliation coming from 
below, and hopefully these kinds of initiatives will spread to the entire civil society.
Conclusively, moving people back may not be the answer to reconciliation in itself. Surely there is a 
need for dialog, but it might be too optimistic to assume it will come automatically if the Ministry 
moves people back. As our above analysis indicates, in the case of the displaced, the civil society 
does not want the government’s prevalent policy of silence and amnesia. There is a wish to 
reconcile, and the few initiatives the government has started, e.g. the youth groups, have met 
backing from the civil society, and the preliminary effects of these emotional programmes have 
been mainly positive. So perhaps this is where the government should concentrate their efforts in 
the future with the support of the CSOs. 
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6.3 Beirut as a Means to Obtain Reconciliation and a Unified Nation
Rebuilding Beirut: Two Pasts and One Future
The government has started to reconstruct Beirut through the before mentioned 
governmental/private company Solidere (Knudsen 2005:4). In this rebuilding they are trying to 
create a national unity by portraying two different pasts. The first past is the pre-war Golden Age 
where there was peace and stability cf. chapter 4.1. By renovating the old colonial buildings and 
recreating the city, the reconstruction is meant to rebuild Beirut as it once was, a: “Paris of the 
Mediterranean” and an: “… ‘intercommunal mixing (…) where Christians and Muslims 
continued to meet together at official functions and served on the same committees, courts, and 
mixed tribunals’.” (Nagel 2002). This can be seen in relation to Anderson’s theory regarding the 
archaeological finds and the construction of monuments, as a means for the state to produce that 
perception of the past, which they want the population to identify with and reproduce (Anderson 
1983:180ff). In that way, the state uses buildings from a time generally remembered more fondly in 
the population, as a tool in creating an image of the nation. This image is of a rich and free nation. 
When it comes to Lebanon, special focus has been put on the capital Beirut as the focal point of the 
nation. 
Before the war, Beirut was the engine of Lebanon’s economical growth, and a place where all the 
various religious groups interacted and shared businesses with each other. The cultural life was 
diverse and people from the various religious groups lived side by side as friends and neighbours. 
The government aims to rebuild the city centre, so it again can become a place of interaction 
between the groups. They have therefore reconstructed new public market squares that allows for 
all the groups to meet, trade, interact and do business, like they did before the war. The government 
and Solidere claim that the new public spaces they have managed to rebuild: “…capture a uniquely 
Lebanese ethos of openness and diversity and are a material representation of Lebanese identity”. 
(Nagel 2002)
The other past, which the government is portraying, is from ancient times. During the rebuilding 
process, there have been archaeological finds, which the government has chosen to preserve, and 
some are now located in the middle of public squares. By preserving these ancient archaeological 
finds it can be agued that the Lebanese government wishes to project the prestige of the past into the 
population’s remembrance and thereby create a positive collective image of their history and 
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heritage. Again this can be seen in relation to Anderson’s view on the state’s role in producing a 
certain image of history. In this case, the image of the nation that is produced, projects a nation and 
a city, which is truly ancient. The government’s archaeological focus can be argued as 
understandable, since it tries to reconstruct the appearance of the city with a rather encouraging 
unified past, due to the now very segregated society with their various unpleasant memories. With 
the preservation of the findings the government has argued to attempt to: “… reinterpret Lebanon’s 
tumultuous past and to create a new collective memory for the Lebanese ‘nation’.” (Nagel 2002) 
and to: “… excavate the heritage of the ‘Lebanese people’, and (…) to indicate the continuity 
between today’s citizenry and Lebanon’s ancient inhabitants.” (Nagel 2002). Whether or not the 
finds actually accomplish this we will discuss later.
Besides the archaeological finds, the government and Solidere have also aimed at creating an image 
of a new and glamorous future, by transforming downtown Beirut into a trade centre. This 
undertaking has been described as the attempt to create a Middle Eastern Hong Kong (Knudsen 
2005:15). Needless to say, the civil war has had its effect on the country’s economy. To revive unity 
via Beirut, the government therefore tries to attract both local and foreign capital by building the 
city with a glamorous modern look. This is especially evident in the new city centre. One of the 
ways to create a positive image of Beirut, as a cosmopolitan city is the aforementioned public 
squares. These public spaces are filled with numerous coffee shops and restaurants and people from 
all over Lebanon and the world are crowding them (El-Masri 2005:19). Despite this positive 
unifying development, it is important to take a closer look on which part of the populace that 
actually enjoys the capital’s new spectacular public spaces. The fact is that the current poverty and 
sectarianism creates obstacles for the contemporary downtown Beirut to target the unification of the 
entire population, which we will discuss shortly.  
Effects and Challenges
The Selective Focus on the Past 
The focus on the past in Beirut is very selective. The government has chosen to focus on the Golden 
Age from the pre-war period and the ancient times. They have not, however, built any monuments 
or museums commemorating the civil war.
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The archaeological finds that the government has chosen to preserve stems from the Phoenician 
period. The Phoenicians were a maritime merchant people that, during ancient times, inhabited parts 
of what today constitutes Lebanon (Abukhalil 1998:6). Especially the Maronites have declared to 
share ancestry with the Phoenicians claiming that the Phoenicians were the founders of the 
Lebanese nation, a phenomenon referred to as ‘Phoenicianism’ (Gilmour 1983:47ff, Reinkowsky 
1997:503). This ancestry was also used, before the war, by the Maronites to distance themselves 
from the Muslim Arabs, as they did not understand themselves as being Arabs but as Lebanese. 
They felt closer ties to Europe than the Middle East. (Gilmour 1983:79f) Because of this Maronite 
claimed connection to the Phoenicians, the archaeological focus on the Phoenicians has not 
surprisingly been connected to Maronite understanding of the Lebanese Nation, something most of 
the other factions in Lebanon distance themselves from. (Reinkowsky 1997:503) The government’s 
target for the reconstruction work is, namely, for it to be a sign of: “… the beginning of legitimate, 
centralized authority where there had been political chaos and fragmentation” and to: “ … create a 
new collective memory for the Lebanese ‘nation’.” a nostalgic vision for the Lebanese populace to 
unify under. (Nagel 2002) The government wanted to create an image of a common history and a 
national unity, by displaying the archaeological finds in Beirut. However, the finds do not seem to 
be unifying for all the Lebanese factions, only for the Maronites. It is therefore peculiar that the 
government has chosen to display the Phoenician finds. A possible reason for this could be that the 
Phoenicians were a people seen as: “…naturally entrepreneurial, commercially-oriented, and 
cosmopolitan.” (Nagel 2002). This is exactly the spirit the government wants the city to project in 
order to attract investment. Besides this, archaeological displays are always good for drawing 
tourists. So perhaps the reason for the displaying of the Phoenician finds is more a matter of 
economy than unity. 
Then there is the problem of the lack of civil war monuments in the capital. How can the 
government create a common history, if a bite of the recent history, which is still fresh in 
everyone’s minds, is missing? A reason for the missing monuments might be that the ones, who 
committed war crimes and are now members of the government, do not want to shed light on that 
part of the past. (Haugbølle 2005:192) Instead, the Phoenician period symbolises something 
ancient, civilized and rich, an image that the government may wish to further, which could also 
explain this focus. Since Lebanon has a history of chaotic, violent, and divided rule, it now tries to 
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manifest national unity. (Nagel 2002) It seems as if the current government would like to forget 
their earlier disputes and move on. 
It is reasonable to ask whether or not it is necessary to build common monuments, war museums, 
and war memorials. Does the government not do the right thing by forgetting about the violent past 
and instead focussing on the ancient stable heritage to build a viable future? With no public 
memorials, museums, and monuments from the civil war, the government only allows for the 
society to focus on the future and the pre-war past and not the traumatic recent war, which could 
cause continuing hostility and develop instability. However, scholars have been criticising the 
rebuilding process and accuses the glamorous post-war Beirut of being used as a façade to hide or 
deny the complex, sensitive, and multifaceted tension among all the groups, which lies beneath. 
(Nagel 2002, El-Masri 2005:21) If these issues are not dealt with but just suppressed, do they, as 
Haugbølle suggests, reappear later on with violent consequences? As Haugbølle explains, many 
people in Lebanon today remember the Golden Age of pre-war Lebanon in the 1960s with 
nostalgia. The Golden Age is thus remembered as their glorious past that was just before the war, 
and as a result the people avoid remembering the violent unpleasant civil war. (Haugbølle 
2005:194) Because the Phoenician finds are linked to the Maronites, these can be argued not to 
have the same glorifying effect. The nostalgic memory of the Golden Age could very well be the 
effect of the government’s lack of public monuments, memorials, museums, etc. concerning the 
war. But one should be aware that many people are not all. Haugbølle also states, that much of the 
population suffers from trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder (Haugbølle 2005:194), so the 
government has not been totally successful in erasing the civil war from the public memory and 
unifying the population around the memory of the pre-war period. In fact, there is a will to start a
dialogue about the war, as we shall examine below. 
Poverty Challenges Unity of the Cosmopolitan Beirut 
As stated earlier, there is a positive development in relation to the usage of the new public spaces. 
However, the people who use them are only members of the richer merchant population and the 
public spaces do therefore not add to a post-war diversity, as Solidere and the government suggest. 
Conversely, the unification is made more challenging due to the increasing poverty and 
sectarianism. Also, this belief in the public spaces’ ability to create diversity suggests, just like the 
critical scholars argue, that what is being focussed on in post-war Lebanon is only materialistic 
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facades and the government shows little interest in portraying or remembering the devastating civil 
warfare. (Nagel 2002, Salem 1994) 
The Solidere reconstruction of the glamorous Beirut has been criticised for suppressing political 
issues but instead reconstructing the service sector, the infrastructure, improving the living 
standards, and rebuilding the sanitary system (Salem 1994). The government has focused only on 
the city centre, which affects the areas just outside Beirut. The poverty has worsened, and the 
suburbs just minutes drive either north or south of the Beirut city centre constitutes the two main 
poverty belts in Lebanon cf. chapter 4.2 (Irin News 2006).  
The reconstruction of post-war Beirut is being criticised for only targeting the middle class, which 
is very small (Knudsen 2005:3). Furthermore, critiques have stated that: “Solidere and the state
are draining state resources to transform the city center into a sanitized Middle Eastern theme 
park while the country remains rife with class, sectarian, and regional divisions and inequalities” 
(Nagel 2002). However, if the government did not focus on the reconstruction of a new 
cosmopolitan Beirut, Lebanon would have difficulties in attracting foreign investment to decrease 
its debt. By getting foreign investment into the country, the government could ideologically slowly 
start to include other political issues on its agenda, such as the sensitive areas mentioned earlier. It 
is, however, important to note, that this focus on Beirut has historical roots, cf. chapter 4.1. 
Civil Remembrance and Unity
As we discuss above, the government’s goal is to create unity via the reconstruction of a glamorous 
Beirut with reference to the Golden Age and an ancient history. All this is done through a state-
sponsored amnesia about the war and without portraying any objects from the war. It is, however, 
interesting to shed light upon how the society is expressing itself. Since one cannot view any 
monuments, museums or memorials from the war in downtown Beirut, monuments and statues are 
scattered within the different communities, with their own war heroes, which represent their 
collective community memory. These local monuments reproduce the sectarian identities, and 
thereby enforce them. If the government built some common monuments which where aimed at all 
the factions, this could be used as a tool by the government to reproduce the Lebanese people, like 
Balibar states cf. chapter 2.3, and thereby facilitate the creation of a national unity. 
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In 1996, an incident occurred which awakened the population from their amnesia. The Israeli army 
executed a massacre in Qana. They killed 106 refugees who lived in a UN compound. This shook 
the Lebanese population, and made them realize, that peace was not implemented in their society. 
Haugbølle argues that even though the government is trying to project a national amnesia over the 
society, the society, especially due to the massacre, has started a public debate, within the last six to 
seven years. It is a discussion of the war memories and how to tackle them. (Haugbølle 2005:191ff) 
The way the civil society expresses them is through cultural productions. In 1998, a film director, 
Ziad Doueiry, made a movie called West Beirut. The film portrayed the war in a humorous manner, 
where it: “… alleviated the common feeling of national and personal guilt and embarrassment, and 
second, it unified the Lebanese in a common memory” (Haugbølle 2005:195). Also, Lebanese 
literature is describing the war with: “… memories of murder, uprooting of families and 
communities, sectarian hatred …” (Haugbølle 2005:195). The massacre in 1996 was thus the key 
incident to alert the people from their amnesiac sleep. Furthermore, in 2001 a public event called 
‘Memory for the Future’ was arranged by the civil society. At this event, intellectuals from Lebanon 
and representatives from Rwanda, Germany and South Africa gathered to discuss their different 
civil wars and how they each remember them. (Haugbølle 2005:195f) This event is a positive 
opening in the before suppressed Lebanese warfare memory, but still there are people who are torn 
between whether it is sensible or not to talk about the war. This, however, can be argued to be due 
to the short time that has passed since the civil war ended. For some people, it might still be too 
early to discuss what happened and share their memories from the war.
Conclusion
Here we will answer the fourth and last sub-question: Which steps has the government made to 
promote reconciliation and national unity by rebuilding Beirut? The rebuilding of Beirut has two 
aims. One is to attract investment and tourists, and the other is to create unity between the different 
groups. The rebuilding focuses on two pasts and one future. The archaeological finds represent the 
ancient past, and the purpose of displaying these is to remind the Lebanese of their common history. 
Unfortunately, the finds from the Phoenician period probably appeal more to the Maronites as they 
have used this image to further their own purposes before. Consequently, the finds play a larger role 
in attracting tourists than in bringing the people together. The other past is the pre-war Golden Age. 
This Golden Age image is projected by renovating the old colonial buildings and by creating open 
spaces where the groups can interact like before the war, making a Paris of the Middle East. This 
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might be working, since many people do remember the period with nostalgia, as Haugbølle says. 
The squares together with the glamorous downtown Beirut also reflect the focus on the future and 
an image of a Hong Kong Beirut, since the newly renovated buildings house large banks and 
businesses. Moreover, the modern cafés on the squares, are too expensive for the poor, and thereby 
exclude the lower classes. This economical focus on the city deprives the needy suburbs and 
countryside of resources, which in the long run may end up being a threat to the image of stability 
now created. 
For the two purposes of unity and economic growth, war monuments have no role, as there is fear 
that they might create controversy instead of unity. But the population and the civil society have 
expressed a need for remembrance of the war and dialogue about it. They no longer want the 
collective amnesia, which the government is trying to sustain. In lack of common war monuments, 
the communities have created their own, which only commemorate their own war heroes. If the 
government made collective war monuments, these could be used as a tool to make a common 
national unity about the war and thereby fill the hole in their history. This is not being done for two 
reasons, one being the mentioned fear that the monuments could create controversy and the other 
that it is difficult for the divided government to agree on what to commemorate. Here the divided 
government, which the Ta’if Accord is again influencing the process. Another sign of the society’s 
weariness regarding the collective amnesia is the many events and cultural initiatives started to 
initiate a dialogue about the war, e.g. the movie West Beirut and the conference about memory. 
Conclusively, on the one hand, the society remembers the pre-war period as a time of unity, and 
using this Golden Age image for the city might therefore be the right way for the government to 
produce a unifying image of the nation, and reproduce the people, as Balibar states. On the other 
hand, the society shows clear signs that they want a dialogue about the war, and the government is 
still refusing to engage in one, from fear of the repercussions.
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7 Conclusion
The civil war left the Lebanese state deeply fragmented and the central state severely weakened. It 
is this situation the Lebanese government is still hampered by, and judging from the current 
situation will be for some time to come. The zuama system has assumed most of the functions 
usually handled by the state, and this underlines their legitimacy while challenging the states 
legitimacy. The Lebanese state needs to reassume these tasks in order to reassert themselves, as the 
only legitimate power in the country, but this is further challenged by the fact that the zuama system 
is not confined to civil society but to the Lebanese Parliament and government as well. Any desire 
to dismantle this system is further hampered by the current confessional system. So is the first step 
to dismantle the consociational system? In theory, this would at least get rid of the confessionalistic 
system but fact is that confessionalism is highly integrated in the Lebanese society. People 
understand themselves in great part along faction lines rather than as Lebanese. 
This is why a reconciliation process, which in time may lead to national unity seems so desirable. 
The way people presently define themselves according to factional lines is counterproductive to the 
reconstruction effort. In order to further such a process the government has started three initiatives. 
They have made a Law of General Amnesty with the aim of creating stability and future 
reconciliation, they have established a Ministry of Displaced to create mixed communities and they 
are rebuilding Beirut and in the process trying to create a unifying image for the Lebanese people. 
In addition to this, the Ta’if Accord also points towards the goal of national unity. 
Having said this, the accord and the confessional political system, which it upholds, contradicts the 
wish to create unity, as it instead reinforces the sectarian divisions. This is counterproductive to the 
Ministry of Displaced’s work towards recreating the old mixed communities. While it seems 
uncertain whether or not this is sensible in the long run, moving people back to where they lived 
before mirrors a will for integration and reconciliation, but basing the political system on divisions 
mirrors a will for separation. Besides this, even if the relocation of people has the desired effect, it 
may not be enough to create integration, reconciliation and national unity in itself.
Of course such an endeavour as creating national unity in a country which never really had any, is 
an enormous task probably lasting more than a generation and would require an enormous 
allocation of resources from the state. According to Balibar, there are certain factors which presence 
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would maximize the possibilities for creating unity, like a common language and race. In Lebanon, 
the official language is Arabic and, viewed objectively, all the people do constitute the same Arab 
race. However, not all Maronites identify with either the Arabic language or the Arab race, but they 
do feel Lebanese, so maybe the task is to get all the other groups in Lebanon to declare themselves 
as Lebanese as well and maybe construct an image where the Lebanese national unity is based on 
diversity, since the Lebanese society is diverse.
While it may seem a hopeless task, signs of unity are present, not in the least during the recent 
Cedar Revolution. While it first of all was surprisingly peaceful it was also very short lived. The 
following election again made the divisions visible, but one must not forget that those who were on 
the streets those days during the protests of the Hariri murder were not the politicians, but everyday 
Lebanese people of all factions under the common banner of the Cedar tree. In light of this, the 
confessional electoral system of Consociationalism certainly seems destructive for the 
reconciliation effort, as another system might have been able to capitalise on the Cedar Revolution 
to create unity.
Why is the system then not dismantled? First of all, as noted, the system is a highly integrated part 
of the Lebanese political system and it is tightly connected to the zuama. Secondly, if the system 
was dismantled, then what? A new electoral system perhaps using some form of majority rule might 
make it possible for new non-sectarian coalitions to form, but then again they might not. Coalitions 
might as well continue the old patterns and in the long run one of the groups, probably the 
Christians, would find themselves politically isolated. Such isolation might lead to some Christians 
feeling frustrated with the situation, and then start an armed resistance, not unlike what was seen for 
many years in Northern Ireland. This is the primary motivation for maintaining the current system. 
It makes change, both positive and negative, difficult and as such it is stable. Thirdly, while the 
Ta'if Accord actually requires that the system should be dismantled, the current government is in 
control because of the accord. Another system might make it more difficult for them to be elected, 
which means that it is not in their personal interest to initiate a reform, which could lead to the end 
of confessionalism. 
Bearing in mind that the Lebanese government is little more than an alliance of necessity between 
the factions, in what view should the current initiatives for national unity and reconciliation be 
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seen? An entire ministry has been created not only to further reconciliation, but also to recreate 
Lebanon as it once was. In fact, it might seem like the government due to the delicate political 
balance is the victim of the largest case of collective amnesia in recent years. The general amnesty 
law has made it impossible to commence any judicial after play and for the victims to obtain 
acknowledgement of the crimes against them and receive justice. As no one has been convicted, 
everyone must be innocent. It is almost like it never happened. People are being relocated to where 
they ones lived, just like before the war. And Beirut has risen from the dead like a Phoenix would 
rise from its own ashes, ready to be the Mediterranean Paris it always has been. But is all this a case 
of large scale amnesia or is it a constructive effort to move on?
Of course it is an attempt to move on, but it is evident that there is a fear of talk and dialogue as it is 
thought to create instability. According to most reconciliation theory, acknowledgement of the past 
is a key element in moving on. Steps towards initiatives, which further dialogue and 
acknowledgement, are presumably not going to come from the government. It is unlikely that they 
want to jeopardize the current stability with any such efforts, let alone agree on what to do. With no 
state acknowledgement of the horrors of the war, it seems difficult for the rest of society to reach 
reconciliation. While this certainly does impair the process studies show that the Lebanese are ready 
to forgive each other, and there are signs that elements of civil society are trying to break the taboo, 
for example films about the life during the war have been made.
Which positive consequences can be mentioned following the government’s initiatives? The youth 
camps initiated by the Ministry of Displaced have shown good results, and it is fair to presume that 
there is a considerable need for initiatives, which deal with the emotional side of the reconciliation 
process. Furthermore, no one can dispute the splendour of the reconstructed city core of Beirut. It is 
obvious that the government hopes that the new Beirut not only will serve as a national symbol of 
Lebanese ingenuity but also as a catalyst for economical growth as well. However, herein lies 
another of Lebanon’s core problems. The immense focus on the reconstruction of Beirut has left 
many other parts of Lebanon untouched by the reconstruction effort. These parts are characterized 
to an important degree by being impoverished. Some scholars claim that an important factor for the 
pre-war tension and indeed even the breakout of the war was the economic divide between the rich 
Beirut and the poor Muslim dominated rural areas. If this is the case, the Lebanese government does 
not seem to have learned its lesson, as the rural areas are still very poor. Actually, most of Lebanon 
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is still very poor. Only the city core of Beirut is rich while the rest of the city is poor, and one could 
fear that this economic divide might spark some of the religious tensions once more.
Conclusively, there is no denying that initiating massive trials or truth commissions at the time the 
Ta’if Accord was signed would probably had been destructive to the peace effort, and as such the 
General Amnesty Law accomplished its task. But having said that, recent events suggest that the 
time is perhaps right for the law to be changed, so initiatives like trials or truth commissions can 
begin. To further help the reconciliation process considerable resources should be allocated to 
initiatives like the youth camps. Furthermore, support for the civil society and their own initiatives 
might also be a good idea. Finally, while the government’s gamble on Beirut can be criticised, it 
may actually be a good initiative considering the situation. At this stage in Lebanon’s development 
it is imperative that the country is able to attract foreign investments to the country, which in the 
long run may be able to strengthen the Lebanese economy to effectively combat poverty. It is 
equally imperative that the government is able to project some form of common Lebanese grandeur, 
a national symbol. Beirut is that symbol of national unity. It is a show of entrepreneurial prowess 
and it is a place for all Lebanese to equally interact with each other. It is such a symbol of national 
unity that the Lebanese government needs to construct, in order to end tensions and hostilities 
between the various groups of the population and bring unity to Lebanon. The most important 
question is then, will the current stability last long enough for the positive effects to show 
considering all the problems Lebanon is currently facing. While the situation is highly problematic 
it is far from hopeless.
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8 Epilogue
In this project our main focus has been the political side of our case, examining the nature and 
effect of the government’s programmes, in the light of the current political system in the country.  
We have questioned the government’s initiatives and how they have affected the society. This has 
primarily been a top-down angle, although we have also focussed on how the society is reacting to 
the initiatives and what they are doing independently from the state. Further work on this project 
could entail more theories, which focus on the societal angle. These could be theories about 
ethnicity and identity, but also about the psychological affects of war and the individual process of 
identity formation. Here a theorist like Erving Goffman could be interesting to use, as he talks of 
the how the individual’s identity is created in everyday life, or Charles Taylor with his theory about 
the importance of recognition in the formation of individual identity. In this project we have limited 
ourselves to examining the tools, which the government can use to obtain reconciliation and 
national unity, and if we were to expand our project, we would add some considerations about the 
psychological process of reconciliation and the feeling of unity. This could advance the analysis of 
the government’s initiatives and give us the possibility of suggesting recommendations from a more 
psychological approach. 
An additional perspective, which could further the discussion in this project, is a view on the 
democratic issues in Lebanon. Here we could draw on the discussion about the feasibility of mixing 
democracy with Islam, using authors like Alfred Stepan, who talks of the Arab, rather than Muslim 
democracy problem, or Elie Kedourie, who discusses the Arab democratic political culture. 
Moreover, a theory about the relationship between nation-building and democracy would be 
interesting to incorporate, to examine whether or not Lebanon is going in the right direction. Here, 
theories from Seymour M. Lipset and Dankwart A. Rustow could shed light on the issue from two 
different sides, one from a modernistic point of departure, arguing that all states follow the same 
linier model, and the other talking about the consolidation of democracy. 
Another aspect of this project, which could benefit from further investigation, is the formation of 
nations and nationalism. It could be interesting to examine this from a different theoretical 
argument than Balibar and Anderson. With a counter theory about nation formation we could 
question the governmental challenges in obtaining national unity and reconciliation from a different 
light. The theory could test the government’s current methods in achieving national unity and 
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reconciliation and suggest another approach. We could also use a theory to shed further light on 
how the different groups perceive the nation and the national image. This could be done by using 
Shamsul Amri Baharuddin’s theory about ‘nations of intent’. This would also entail a more detailed 
study of the different factions’ understanding of the Lebanese nation. 
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1Appendix 1
The Ta'if Accord
   
This agreement, which ended the civil war in Lebanon, was negotiated in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, in 
September 1989 and approved by the Lebanese parliament on 4 November 1989.
First, General Principles and Reforms:
I. General Principles
A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its citizens.
B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of the Arab League and is 
committed to the league's charter. It is an active and founding member of the United Nations Organization 
and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon 
shall embody these principles in all areas and spheres, without exception.
C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public liberties, especially the 
freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and on equality in rights and duties among all citizens, 
without discrimination or preference.
D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovreign and they shall exercise their sovreignty through 
the constitutional institutions.
E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and private ownership.
F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the state's unity and of the 
system's stability.
G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal, economic, and social reform.
H. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled to live in and enjoy 
any part of the country under the supremacy of the law. The people may not be categorized on the basis of 
any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of 
Palestinians in Lebanon].
I. No authority violating the common co-existance charter shall be legitimate
II. Political Reforms
A. Chamber of Deputies: The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which exercises full control over 
government policy and activities.
1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the duration of the chamber's term.
2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy speaker, the chamber my vote only once 
to withdraw confidence from its speaker or deputy speaker with a 2/3 majority of its members and in 
accordance with a petition submitted by at least 10 deputies. In case confidence is withdrawn, the chamber 
shall convene immediately to fill the vacant post.
3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued unless it is included in the agenda of a 
public session and read in such a session, and unless the grace period stipulated by the constitution passes 
without a resolution on such a bill with the approval of the cabinet.
4. The electoral district shall be the governorate.
5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of secterian restriction, the parliamentary seats 
2shall be divided according to the following bases:
a. Equally between Christians and Muslims.
b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect.
c. Proportionately between the districts.
6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased to 108, shared equally between 
Christians and Muslims. As for the districts created on the basis of this document and the districts whose 
seats became vacant prior to the proclamation of this document, their seats shall be filled only once on an 
emergency basis through appointment by the national accord government that is planned to be formed.
7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not secterian, basis, a senate shall be 
formed and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. The senate powers shall be confined to crucial 
issues.
B. President of Republic: The president of republic is the head of the state and a symbol of the country's unity. 
He shall contribute to enhancing the constitution and to preserving Lebanon's independence, unity, and 
territorial integrity in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. He is the supreme commander of the 
armed forces which are subject to the power of the cabinet. The president shall exercise the following powers:
1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting.
2. Head the Supreme Defense Council.
3. Issues decrees and demand their publication. He shall also be entitled to ask the cabinet to reconsider any 
resolution it makes within 15 days of the date of depostion of the resolution with the presidential office. Should 
the cabinet insist on the adopted resolution, or should the grace period pass without issuing and returning the 
decree, the decree of the resolution shall be valid and must be published.
4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the constitution and demand their 
publication upon ratification by the Chamber of Deputies. After notifying the cabinet, the president may also 
request reexamination of the laws within the grace periods provided by the constitution, and in accordance 
with the articles of the constitution. In case the laws are not issued or returned before the end of the grace 
periods, they shall be valid by law and they must be published.
5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies.
6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber of Deputies speaker on the basis of 
binding parliamentary consultation, the outcome of which the president shall officially familiarize the speaker 
on.
7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently.
8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the cabinet.
9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet ministers and decrees relieving them 
from their duties.
10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and award state medals by decree.
11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion and signing of international treaties 
which shall become valid only upon approval by the cabinet. The cabinet shall familiariaze the Chamber of 
Deputies with such treaties when the country's interest and state safety make such familiarization possible. As 
for treaties involving conditions concerning state finances, trade treaties, and other treaties which may not be 
abrogated annually, they may not be concluded without Chamber of Deputies' approval.
12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of Deputies.
13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of Deputies to hold special sessions by 
decree.
14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any urgent issue beyond the agenda.
15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a special session whenever he deems it 
3necessary.
16. Grant special pardon by decree.
17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless he violates the constitution or 
commits high treason.
C. Prime Minister: The prime minister is the head of the government. He represents it and speaks in its name. 
He is responsible for implementing the general policy drafted by the cabinet. The prime minister shall exercise 
the following powers:
1. Head the cabinet.
2. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with the president the decree forming it. 
The cabinet shall submit its cabinet statement to the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence within 30 
days [of its formation]. The cabinet may not exercise its powers before gaining the confidence, after its 
resignation, or when it is considered retired, except within the narrow sense of disposing of affairs.
3. Present the government's general policy to the Chamber of Deputies.
4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and decrees accepting cabinet resignation
or considering it retired.
5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and requesting the reexamination of 
laws.
6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarize the president of the republic in advance with the 
issues included in the agenda and with the urgent issues to be discussed, and sign the usual session 
minutes.
7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions, coordinate between the ministers, and 
issue general instructions to ensure the smooth progress of work.
8. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the presence of the minister concerned.
9. By law, act as the Supreme Defense Council's deputy chairman.
D. Cabinet:
The executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.
The following are among the powers exercised by it:
1- Set the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up draft bills and decrees, and takes the 
necessary decisions for its implementation.
2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise the activities of all the state agencies 
without exception, including the civilian, military, and security departments and institutions.
3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces.
4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in accordance with the law.
5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of the president of the republic if the 
chamber refuses to meet throughout an ordinary or a special session lasting no less than one month, even 
though it is summoned twice consecutively, or if the chamber sends back the budget in its entirety with the 
purpose of paralyzing the government. This right may not be exercised again for the same reasons which 
called for dissolving the chamber in the first instance.
6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet sessions. The cabinet shall meet 
periodically at special headquarters. The legal quorum for a cabinet meeting is 2/3 the cabinet members. The 
cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by consent. If impossible, then by vote. The resolutions shall be adopted by 
a majority of the members present. As for major issues, they require the approval of 2/3 the cabinet members. 
The following shall be considered major issues: The state of emergency and it abolition, war and peace, 
general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state's general budget, comprehensive and 
4long-term development plans, the appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalent, reexamination of 
the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the 
personal status laws, and the dismissal of cabinet ministers.
E. Minister: The minister's powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible with the government's general 
policiy and with the principle of collective responsibility. A minister shall not be relieved from his position 
unless by cabinet decree or unless the Chamber of Deputies withraws its confidence from him individually.
F. Cabinet Resignation, Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers:
1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases:
a. If its chairman resigns.
b. If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the decree forming it.
c. If its chairman dies.
d. At the beginning of a president's term.
e. At the beginning of the Chamber of Deputies' term.
f. When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from it on an initiative by the chamber itself and on 
the basis of a vote of confidence.
2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the republic and the prime minister, with 
cabinet approval.
3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of Deputies shall, by law, be considered to 
be convened in a special session until a new cabinet is formed. A vote-of-confidence session shall follow.
G. Abolition of Political Secterianism: Abolishing political secterianism is a fundamental national objective. To 
achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies 
electedon the basis of equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve 
this objective and to form a national council which is headed by the president of the republic and which 
includes, in addition to the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, and 
social notables. The council's task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing 
sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation of 
the phased plan. The following shall be done in the interim period:
a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in public jobs, the 
judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in the independent agencies in accordance 
with the dictates of national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared 
equally by Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.
b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card.
III. Other Reforms
A. Administrative Decentralism:
1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central authority.
2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and all state 
administartions shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the highest level possible so as to 
facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally.
3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national fusion within the 
framework of preserving common coexistance and unity of the soil, people, and institutions.
4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of the smaller administrative units [ 
district and smaller units ] through the election of a council, headed by the district officer, in every district, to 
ensure local participation.
5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces economically and 
socially shall be adopted and the resources of the municipalities, unified municipalities, and municipal unions 
shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources.
5B. Courts:
[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law and to insure harmony 
between the action of the legislative and executive authorities on the one hand, and the givens of common 
coexistance and the basic rights of the Lebanese as stipulated in the constitution on the other hand:
1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose task it is to try presidents and 
ministers shall be formed. A special law on the rules of trial before this council shall be promulgated.
2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe the constitutionality of the 
laws, and to settle disputes and contests emanating from presidential and parliamentary elections.
3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to 
interpreting the constitution and observing the constitutionality of the laws:
a. The president of the republic.
b. The Chamber of Deputies speaker.
c. The prime minister.
d. A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies.
[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the Lebanese sects may 
revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to:
1. Personal status affairs.
2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites.
3. Freedom of religious education.
[3]. To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the the Higher Judiciary Council shall be 
elected by the judiciary body.
D. Parliamentary Election Law: Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance with a new law on the 
basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee common coexistance between the Lebanese, and 
that ensure the sound and efficient political representation of all the people's factions and generations. This 
shall be done after reviewing the administrative division within the context of unity of the people, the land, and 
the institutions.
E. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development: A socioeconomic council shall be created to insure 
that representatives of the various sectors participate in drafting the state's socioeconomic policy and 
providing advice and proposals.
F. Education:
1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the elementary stage at least.
2. The freedom of education shall be emphasized in accordance with general laws and regulations.
3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private schools and textbooks shall be 
strengthened.
4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, strengthened, and developed in a 
manner that meets the country's development and reconstruction needs. The conditions of the Lebanese 
University shall be reformed and aid shall be provided to the university, especially to its technical colleges.
5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, 
spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national education.
G. Information: All the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law and within the 
framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of ending the state of 
war.
Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories:
Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong state founded on the 
basis of national accord, the national accord government shall draft a detailed one-year plan whose objective 
is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories gradually with the state's 
6own forces. The broad lines of the plan shall be as follows:
A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The militias' weapons shall be 
delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 months, beginning with the approval of the national 
accord charter. The president of the republic shall be elected. A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and 
the political reforms shall be approved constitutionally.
B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through:
1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without exception, beginning the training of volunteers 
centrally, distributing the volunteers to the units in the governorates, and subjecting them to organized 
periodic training courses.
2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and departure of individuals into and out 
of the country by land, air, and sea.
C. Strengthening the armed forces:
1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, and if necessary, protect public order 
when the danger exceeds the capability of the internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own.
2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in preserving security under 
conditions determined by the cabinet.
3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they may be able to shoulder their 
national responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression.
4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, the armed forces shall 
return to their barracks.
5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganized to serve military objectives exclusively.
D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the right of every Lebanese 
evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established. Legistlation to 
guarantee this right and to insure the means of reconstruction shall be issued. Considering that the objective 
of the State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, 
represented primarily by the internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding Syria to 
Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread 
the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning with ratification of 
the national accord charter, election of the president of the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, 
and approval of the political reforms constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments -- the 
Syrian Government and the Lebanese National Accord Government -- shall decide to redeploy the Syrian 
forces in Al-Biq'a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-al-Mudayrij-'Ayn Darah line, and if necessary, at 
other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. An agreement shall also be 
concluded by the two governments to determine the strength and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in 
the above-mentioned area and to define these forces' relationship with the Lebanese state authorities where 
the forces exist. The Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop 
this agreement.
Third, liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation:
Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-recognized Lebanese borders 
requires the following:
A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council resolutions calling for fully 
eliminating the Israeli occupation.
B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949.
C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation, to spread 
state sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy the Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to 
Israel; and making efforts to reinforce the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli 
withdawl and to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.
7Fourth, Lebanese-Syrian Relations:
Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal relations. Between Lebanon 
and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, 
and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on which the two countries' coordination and cooperation is 
founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner 
that accomplishes the two fraternal countries' interests within the framework of the sovereignty and 
independence of each of them. Therefore, and because strengthening the bases of security creates the 
climate needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to 
Syria's security, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Lebanon's security under 
any circumstances. Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a base for any 
force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria's security. Syria, which is eager for 
Lebanon's security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act 
that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.
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